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ABSTRACT'
This paper employs a comparative method to illustrate how the
subject of impasses in collective bargaining negotiations offers sub-
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stantial insights into the nature of statutory and common law. Specifi-
cally, it illuminates how judicial laws. The systems examined are those
of the United States (the National Labor Relations Act) and New Zea-
land (the Employment Contracts Act). The National Labor Relations Act
provides a widely followed framework for supporting collective bargain-
ing. The Employment Contracts Act, in contrast, embodies principles of
freedom of contract and market as understood by its drafters. This arti-
cle examines how judges apply these two statutes to the problem of
managing impasses. It then explores how the interaction of law and
society provides insights which help to address current issues in collec-
tive bargaining law reform.
INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining is traditionally regarded as a pluralistic, remedial
response to inequality in the employment relationship.' Most industrial-
ized nations establish regulatory procedures to provide a voice to those
likely to suffer exploitation in the employment relationship; the most
common of these is collective bargaining. Now, as we approach the end
of the twentieth century, collective bargaining has existed as a widely
embedded feature of the employment landscape for generations. New
Zealand, for example, legalized collective bargaining over a century ago
in 1894 through the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (the
IC&A Act).3 The United States, a newcomer by comparison, slowly ex-
tended legalized collective bargaining for nearly three-fourths of a centu-
ry through the enactment of miscellaneous statutes, including the Rail-
way Labor Act of 1926, 4 and the National Labor Relations Act (Wag-
ner Act) of 1935,s which still remain in force.
Longevity, however, is no longer a guarantee of success. Indeed,
today, it is just as likely to be taken as evidence of a system that is
outmoded and ill-suited to contemporary conditions. In this decade,
traditional collective bargaining is often spoken of as a discredited struc-
ture. Many suggest collective bargaining should be, and is being, dis-
carded in favor of systems designed, insofar as is possible, as vehicles
to permit unfettered market forces to act as the medium for allocating
2. See RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 47 (Sheldon Fried-
man, et al. eds., 1994).
3. AJ. GEARE, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NEw ZEALAND 30-
31 (2nd rev. ed., 1988).
4. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1986).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1994).
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goods and services. Supply-side economics, notions of market clearing,
and individual choice in the labor market now dominate the discourse in
various guises.' Supporters advance these concepts as providing virtually
scientific and infallible foundations for deregulating fundamental features
of modem society.8 In the context of this debate, policy makers closely
scrutinize the traditional ends of labor legislation and, in some cases,
discard them.
The struggle over collective bargaining plays out in the law itself.9
Today, collective bargaining and neo-classical economics"° are not ab-
stract theories, nor are they conflicts between their proponents locked in
abstract debate. The Wagner Act" and the New Zealand Employment
Contracts Act, 1991 (ECA) models" embody these conflicting philoso-
phies. 3 The Wagner or National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 4 val-
ues government regulation intended to support independent collective
representation as a legitimate force whose purpose is to contest manage-
ment control and prerogative. The Wagner Act demonstrates a belief that
management control, if left unfettered, harms society.'5 The ECA mod-
6. See Ellen J. Dannin, Collective Bargaining, Impasse and Implementation of
Final Offers: Have We Created a Right Unaccompanied by Fulfillment, 19 ToLEDO L
REv. 41-68 (1987) [hereinafter Dannin, Collective]; Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of
Collective Bargaining in the USA: Reflections on the Un-American Character of A-
merican Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L 307 (1994).
7. See EmPLOYMNT SECURnTY AND LABOR MApRT BEHAVIOR 425 (Christoph
F. Buechtemann, ed. 1993) [hereinafter EMPLO MNr SEcuRrTY].
8. Id.
9. Cf. Robert Kagan, How Much Does Law Matter? Labor Law, Competition,
and Waterfront Labor Relations in Rotterdam and U.S. Ports, 24 L. & SOc'Y REV.
35, 35-36 (1990).
10. Throughout this article, the phrase "neo-classical economics" is used to refer
to current popular views concerning appropriate ways of ordering society, which advo-
cate reliance on market forces. It is also referred to as New Right or neo-liberal eco-
nomic theory.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1994).
12. Employment Contracts Act, 1991, Long Title, (N.Z.) [hereinafter ECA].
13. The State of Victoria, Australia adopted ECA-like legislation in 1992, and
various provinces of Canada, European countries and Japan currently are considering
similar changes. Although we see this debate as new, discussion surrounding the
NLRA involved many of these same arguments. Daniel Ernst, Common Laborers?
Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists. and the Law of Indiustrial Disputes, 1915-1943,
11 L. & HIST. REV. 59, 63-65 (1993).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68.
15. Id.
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el,16 in contrast, perceives the employment relationship through the
conceptual lens of neo-classical economics. In this system, representa-
tional issues are matters of individualized preference and the market
tests the value of any regulation.
7
In most ways, the two models are antithetical to one another. The
goal of the NLRA model is the creation of institutions consciously de-
signed to impede the forces of market clearing.' The NLRA imposes
an obligation on employers to engage in collective negotiations to estab-
lish work place terms and conditions as soon as a majority of the em-
ployees selects a labor organization as their representative." Therefore,
a bargaining obligation comes into existence before any formal contract
of employment exists and regardless of whether any agreement ever
emerges." Although a grossly simplified statement, in essence, the bar-
gaining obligation continues as a matter of a union's attaining the status
of bargaining representative, almost without connection to the contractual
relationship.2' This bargaining obligation applies whenever a party wish-
es to alter existing work place conditions.'
In contrast, the ECA states that the New Zealand legislature enacted it
"to promote an efficient labour market." 3 Its structure rejects the idea
16. ECA.
17. Id. §§ 5-8.
18. The statement of findings declares that Congress enacted this legislation to
promote the peaceful adjustment of disputes by "restoring equality of bargaining pow-
er" between employees "who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract" and "employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms
of ownership" and to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 151. Encouraging this practice was based, in part, on setting up a sys-
tem which, once in place, could meaningfully give the parties autonomy to seek their
own ends. The individual, not the state agent, was to be responsible for doing so.
David Brody, Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins of the Wagner Act, in RESTORING THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 29, 47 (Sheldon Friedman, et al. eds., 1994); see
Thomas Kohler, The Overlooked Middle in THE LEGAL FurURE OF EMPLOYEE REPRE-
SENTATION 224, 236 (Matthew Finkin, ed. 1994).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (d); ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LA-
BOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECrIE BARGAINING 374-531 (1976).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
23. See ECA, Long Title. Minister of Labour Bill Birch expressed this view
when, in debates on the ECA, he stated:
That is what labour market reform is all about-increased productivity and bet-
ter ways of doing things, leading to better output, more exports, better profits,
a higher standard of living, and better wages. That is the bottom line. It is
920 [VOL. 11:6
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that individual workers do not possess the power to bargain meaningful-
ly with their employers. Rather than impeding market forces, the ECA
exposes workplace relationships to their full impact.24 To the extent
that they actually operate in the labor market, the ECA model places no
obligation on the parties to contend against the laws of supply and
demand.2 Furthermore, it expresses no preference for either the collec-
tive or the individual, either in contracts of employment or in negotia-
tions. The ECA model does, however, presume that all work place
contractual relationships, collective or not, exist between the employee
and the employer onlyY In effect, the ECA frees employers to pursue
contracts unfettered by institutional regulations so they can make discrete
calibrations in line with labor market conditions.
If the express policies of the two acts fully informed their application,
collective bargaining in the two countries ought to function very differ-
ently. Remarkably, however, when the court systems in the United
States and New Zealand have interpreted how their legislative regimes
intend to resolve bargaining impasses,' they have appeared to con-
verge. At times, the practical application of the courts' doctrines are
virtually identical. Yet any convergence suggests that the courts in
these two countries have deviated from their drafters' original intentions.
These divergences offer opportunities for understanding how statutory
and judge-made law interact with each other and with society.' In
their times, both the NLRA and the ECA were radically remedial stat-
utes, enacted to redress perceived systemic defects in the operation of
their respective labor markets.3 This article ultimately focuses on the
time for us to seek improvements in our work arrangements so that we are
more efficient, more productive, and more export oriented.
PARL. DEB. (HANSARD), 43D PARL., 2D SESS., 1429 (Apr. 23, 1991).
24. ECA.
25. Il
26. Id. §§ 18-20.
27. ld. § 17.
28. In this paper, "impasse" is used to mean the point in negotiations at which
the parties are stalemated and are unable to achieve rapprochement in the bargaining
context without resort to economic weapons or procedures designed to foster agree-
ment. Cf. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 665 (1988) (defining impasse
as "deadlock").
29. See RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DIsPuTEs, AND DI rmmRIoN (1986).
30. See Anne Knowles, Four Months Down the Track. Is Emplo)nent Contracts
Act Working?, EXAMINER, Sept. 5, 1991, at 19; Ellen J. Dannin, Labor Law Reform
in New Zealand, 13 N.Y L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L 26 (1992) [hereinafter Dan-
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way judicial interpretation, public mores and tacit pressure have trans-
formed such remedial legislative schemes.
Impasse is a particularly appropriate subject for studying the intersec-
tion of these forces. In public discourse today, getting one's economic
figures right is more important than trying to achieve goals such as
social justice, order, or democracy. The economic thought represented in
most current public discourse, however, is but a narrow spectrum: the
neo-classical school as understood and explained by its popularizers.
This perception has important implications for labor law. It assumes
that, for the ECA and, increasingly, the NLRA model, any regulation is
assumed to delay market sensitivity and causes alarm." In addition, it
is more likely that proponents of this viewpoint will interpret stalemate
or impasse in contract negotiations as an unjustifiable restraint on trade
as opposed to a stage in a relationship or, more negatively, a breakdown
in a relationship. Thus, how legislation and the judiciary deal with an
impasse in collective negotiations is the contemporary crucible of labor
law. It demonstrates dramatically whether the legislative system both
recognizes and supports, as legitimate, rights to independent representa-
tion and to co-determination of employment conditions.
All industrial relations systems provide some means to break dead-
lock, expressly or implicitly, formally or informally, balanced or unbal-
anced, even if the means for resolving deadlock is not ordinarily identi-
fied as an impasse procedure.32 It is crucial to realize that even the
absence of an express impasse procedure in legislation does not mean
that none exists. Not providing third-party assistance is but one of many
ways to deal with a bargaining impasse. Although all of these exist as
choices among a range of ways of dealing with impasse, different con-
sequences flow from choosing a system with an express mechanism as
opposed to one with no mandated procedure.
Neither the ECA nor the NLRA provides express means for resolving
negotiating impasses. It must be asked how the two statutes both come
to have no express method of resolving impasse, leaving the parties,
unaided by government intervention, to their own means of resolving
impasse. This similarity at first seems odd, given the difference in their
philosophical underpinnings. In fact, one came about as a matter of
omission and one as a result of commission.
nin, Labor]; GEARE, supra note 3.
31. See EMPLOYMENT SECuRrrY, supra note 7, at 47; Reinhold Fahlbeck, supra
note 6, at 307-09.
32. See Daniel R. Ernst, supra note 13, at 62; Kagan, supra note 9, at 35-37.
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The ECA is silent on how parties should resolve impasses because its
drafters trusted in the operation of the market and common law to fll
any gaps. In addition, and more important, the ECA was a reaction
against what existed before. From 1894, New Zealand operated under a
regime which imposed a high degree of government intervention in the
settlement of contracts.33 This included conciliation councils and setting
terms of employment through mandated arbitration awards.' The
ECA's drafters wanted the new system to be free of these conditions.
The reason behind the lack of an express impasse system in the
NLRA is less clear. Although exploring this could be the subject of a
full article, a few points are relevant here as background for the way in
which the NLRA was interpreted by the courts. First, although the Unit-
ed States Congress enacted the NLRA to promote worker empowerment
and democratize the work place, its paramount goal is not human rights
but stabilizing commerce.35 The statute's focus on business as its ulti-
mate goal, a value that would override others such as economic democ-
racy, may leave the statute to give less attention to provisions for im-
passe. Furthermore, an important philosophical trend among some who
influenced the drafters of the NLRA was to see the state "as little more
than the enforcer of the bargains created by autonomous, organized and
voluntary but conflicting economic interests."36 In addition, the inter-
play of statute and common law was current among those whose
thought influenced the NLRA. The drafters of the NLRA argued for a
rejection of the absolutes of existing jurisprudence and a return to
particularism and empiricism, which they believed informed the common
law courts nearly a millennium before.'
33. See A STUDY OF TiE LABOUR F_.,PLOYhMrT COURT (New Zealand Bus.
Roundtable ed.) (on file with AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y); Peter Boxall & Peter
Haynes, Unions and Non-Union Bargaining Agents Under the Emplo)7ments Contracts
Act of 1991: An Assessment after 12 Months, 17 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 223 (1993).
34. See Boxall & Haynes, supra note 33, at 223-27.
-35. Elinore Herrick testified that whether the NLRA legislation provided a pro-
gram for economic recovery stood or fell on "the reality of opportunity given to
labor to bargain collectively." H.R. REP. No. 8423, 73D CONG., 2D SESs. (1934), re-
printed in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACr
211 (1935) [hereinafter NLRB LEG. HISTORY]. This is obvious in a reading of NLRA
§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
36. Ernst, supra note 13, at 67, 74-75, 81-82. John R. Commons. for example,
expressly rejected mechanisms such as compulsory arbitration. Id.
37. Id. at 69-70.
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Thus, although their purposes were different, there are important re-
spects in which similar strains of thought influenced both the ECA and
NLRA, particularly faith in common law. They differ in that ECA pro-
ponents saw the common law as the repository of universal truths,38
while NLRA proponents saw the common law as a means of rejecting
the universal for the particular.39 Therefore, for a variety of reasons,
some different and some similar, both the ECA and NLRA do not pre-
scribe intervention or any other express method of resolving impasse.
When legislation is silent on important issues, such as resolving im-
passe, the judiciary must address the lacunae by applying common law
substantive and interpretational principles.' Separate court systems fill
this legislative gap in the ECA and NLRA by interpreting antithetical
statutes to provide similar methods of impasse resolution, allowing em-
ployers to impose contract terms unilaterally. Yet a reading of the sta-
tutes' representational structures, language and philosophical underpin-
nings suggests that such an interpretational outcome would be impossi-
ble.
Indeed, the more recent New Zealand court decisions, discussed be-
low, reign in employers' power to impose employment terms, arguably
making the ECA more protective of the employee in bargaining than the
NLRA.4 These developments caution any who assume that labor legis-
lation, including its express intent and purpose, are indurate methods of
regulation which mechanistically determine outcomes. This, in turn,
suggests we explore the mechanisms which fail to insulate labor legis-
lation from wider social forces. Just as judicial interpretation of the
Wagner Act subverts its original intent, so, too, interpretation of the
38. These universal truths were, for many, based in economics. The NZBR ar-
gued that the proper form for labor law was that it should be no different than the
common law of contract. Supplementary Submission to the Labour Select Committee
on the Options Paper 1 (New Zealand Bus. Roundtable ed., Mar. 1991) (on file with
AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y). The only criteria by which all statutes were to be
judged, according to the NZBR, was by "their impact on the willingness of employers
to take on new staff." Id. at 4. See Dannin, Overcome, supra note 1, at 49-50.
39. More recently, labor leaders such as Richard Trumka and Lane Kirkland have
called for the repeal of the NLRA and a return to common law. Trumka explained:
"I have a profound faith in the judiciary and jury system as it exists at common law.
It has been the enduring bulwark against biased decision making by 'experts."' Rich-
ard Truika, Wy Lt,, . -, I Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 881 (1987).
40. LEMPERT & SANDERS, supra note 29, at 440-44.
41. See discussion infra at I.B.2.
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market-driven ECA hinders its ability to deliver the perfectly competitive
labor market its drafters strove to create.4
The industrial relations literature, labor law articles and treatises large-
ly overlook the judicially developed doctrine of employer unilateral
implementation of final offers upon impasse under the NLRA.0 Most
standard industrial relations texts expend their energies on bargaining
tactics and the possibilities of using third-party mediation when it ap-
pears that resolution is not forthcoming." Academic labor lawyers fo-
cus on other issues and thus fail to appreciate the importance of impasse
for those who negotiate under the NLRA.4s Overlooking impasse and
implementation encourages the perception that a degree of equality oper-
ates between the parties. In reality, however, this doctrine decisively tips
the balance of power in favor of the employer. Academics in labor law
focus their discussion of law reform elsewhere, ignoring how powerfully
this judicially developed doctrine reshapes the legislative system.rs This
leads reformers to advocate rewriting the legislation, when it is not the
statute, so much as its interpretation by the courts, which legalizes con-
duct its drafters defined as violating the law.
These oversights on the doctrine of impasse are difficult to explain.
Compared with striker replacement, an issue which has recently been the
focus of extensive scholarship and attempted legislative reform in the
United States, unilateral implementation of final offers is a far more
widespread phenomenon with a more pernicious impact on collective
42. Cf The Labour Relations Bill, THE EFPLOYER, April 1987 (pointing out the
areas in which the Labour Relations Act failed to live up to the drafters' hopes).
43. One exception is Kate Bronfrenbrenner's work, which addresses the issue
within the context of first contracts as opposed to bargaining in general. She found
that when an employer declares an impasse and implements its final offer, unions
won first contracts in only four of seven units. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Enployer Be-
havior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor
Law Reform, in RESTORING TM PROMISE OF A MRICAN LABOR LAw 75, 84, 86
(Sheldon Friedman et al., eds., 1994).
44. For examples of such texts, see WIiAMi COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND
PuBuc Poucy: FAILURE TO SECURE FRST CONTRACTS 56 (1985); THOmAS KOCHAN,
ET At., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AhERCAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 223 (1994).
45. For examples of such discussions, see Martin Malin, Aftenvord: Labor Law
Reform: Waiting for Congress? in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EimLOYE REPRESENTA-
TION 252 (Matthew Finkin, ed. 1994); PAUL WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORPTLACE:
THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EimnOYMENT LAw (1990).
46. Cf Fahlbeck, supra note 6; Jeffrey S. Follett, The Union As Contract: Inter-
nal and External Union Markets After 'Pattern Makers,' 15 BERKELEY J. EM,P. &
LAB. L. 1 (1994).
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bargaining.' Its impact occurs even in situations where there is no im-
passe nor implementation of final offers. Parties enter bargaining know-
ing that this power to implement exists and hence shape their strategies
according to whether they want to reach or forestall impasse. 48 It is
peculiar that scholarly attention focuses on the problem of permanent
replacements without addressing the role impasse and implementation
play in creating the necessary prerequisites for permanent replacement of
strikers to occur.49
47. A conservative and preliminary estimate is that from the period 1980-1995,
unilateral implementation upon impasse resulted in NLRB charges at least ten times
as often as did charges of permanent replacement of strikers. The preliminary results
of the authors' search of NLRB cases through the Labor Relations Reporting Manual
for 1980-1995 discloses 261 cases involving impasse during negotiations for a succes-
sor contract and 26 involving permanent replacement of strikers, with a great deal of
overlap. These results likely understate the relative incidence and impact of unilateral
implementation, compared with permanent replacements, for several reasons. Intuitively
speaking, an NLRB charge is more likely to be filed where strikers are permanently
replaced; whereas, only the more egregious and clear case of unilateral implementation
will result in the filing of NLRB charges. Those instances in which the employer's
ability to implement only influences bargaining by, for example, forcing the union to
make concessions to stave off impasse, will not result in charges. A charge involving
unilateral implementation is more likely not to go to trial, and thus, is less likely to
be reported than is one involving permanent replacements, since the differences in
remedies make it easier to settle the former. The remedies for most unilateral imple-
mentation cases is only a cease and desist order and no monetary damages. The au-
thors are currently trying to establish with greater precision the incidence and impact
of implementation.
48. The authors together with Dr. Terry Wagar, St. Mary's University, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada, are currently collecting data on the incidence and precursors to impasse.
49. Getting accurate figures of the incidence of replacement of strikers is diffi-
cult. One study, rooted in a search of Westlaw databases, found that between 1935
and 1991, 299 strikes involved replacements, or slightly over five per year. See Mi-
chael LeRoy, Regulating Employer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empirical
Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes 1935-1991, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 169,
169-184 (1995); Michael LeRoy, The Changing Character of Strikes Involving Perma-
nent Striker Replacements, 1935-1990, 16 J. LAB. RES. 423 (1995).
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I. BARGAINING AND IMPASSE RESOLUTION
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACr
1. The Statutory Scheme of the NLRA
When Congress first introduced the NLRA as S.2926" or "The La-
bor Disputes Act," it stated:
[that the tendency towards integration] and centralized control has long
since destroyed the balance of bargaining power between the individual
employer and the individual employee, and has rendered the individual,
unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to se-
cure a just reward for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of
living5 l
Had the drafters of the legislation enacted the original bill, the NLRA
would today provide for conciliation, mediation and arbitration, as sug-
gested by the quote. Individuals argued that the legislation must remedy
"the matter of bringing collective bargaining negotiations to a conclu-
sion." Today, however, the NLRA is expressly inhospitable to concili-
ation and mediation.' Rather than assist in resolving impasses, the
NLRA opted for a system that, as another witness at the Wagner hear-
ings testified, gives "the reality of opportunity... to labor to bargain
collectively."'- The NLRA does this through providing legislative sup-
ports to collective action by workers, because "the isolated worker is a
plaything of fate."55
Many who testified at these early hearings recognized that it was
imperative for the new legislation to require an employer to confer with
its employees' representative to resolve grievances 5  Economist Arthur
50. H.R. REP. No. 8423, 73D CONG., 2D SESS. (1934), reprinted in NLRB LEG.
HISTORY, supra note 35, at 1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 149-50 (testimony of Sidney Hillman).
53. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint
individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis."
NLRA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994).
54. H.R. REP. No. 8423, 73D CONG., 2D SESS. (1934), reprinted in NLRB. LEG.
HISTORY, supra note 35, at 149-50 (1935) (testimony of Elinore Herrick).
55. National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on S. 19S8 Before the Senate Comm.
on Educ. & Labor, 74TH CONG., lsT SEss. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB. LEGtSLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Act 2321 (1935) (hereinafter
NLRB LEG. HISTORY H).
56. Id.
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Suffem observed that labor regarded the prior legislation, § 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),57 as inadequate because it
was "merely a pious declaration of the right of labor to organize and to
bargain collectively .... [which went] to the right of every employer
to determine his own course as he will, regardless of the wishes of the
workers." ' He concluded it was impossible to expect "that the rules of
the game will be fair, if those with power and selfish interests at stake
are allowed to make them." 59
Employers, however, objected that an unfair labor practice which
required them to demonstrate that they had exerted every reasonable ef-
fort to make and maintain agreements would harm the economy.6'
They argued that labor paid no attention to the economic exigencies
employers faced and "refused to be guided by any economic laws, by
any conditions affecting local plants, striving to continue in existence,
by any requirements of competition or any ordinary business economics
or economy."6' In short, the preexisting assumptions were that the bus-
iness, including corporations, were in effect the employer's private pos-
sessions and that only the employer could be trusted to protect the
business' productivity and even existence. 62 The NLRA's basic struc-
ture incorporates this unquestioned assumption.
63
57. 48 Stat. 198 (1933). See Brody, supra note 18, at 29 (discussing Section 7).
58. H.R. REP. No. 8423, 73D CONG., 2D SESS, (1934), reprinted in NLRB LEG.
HISTORY, supra note 35, at 315.
59. Id. at 316.
60. Id. at 539-40.
61. Id. at 541.
62. These views later came to dominate the interpretation of the NLRA. See
JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASsUMPTIONS IN AMERIcAN LABOR LAW 1-16 (1983).
63. In a statement redolent with meaning for the future, the Senate Committee
reported that, with regard to employer refusals to bargain collectively:
The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is
designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental super-
vision of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively
does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of
collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether propos-
als made to it are satisfactory. But, after deliberation, the committee has con-
cluded that this fifth unfair labor practice should be inserted in the bill. It
seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing is a mere delusion if it is not
accompanied by the correlative duty on the part of the other party to recognize
such representatives as they have been designated (whether as individuals or
labor organizations) and to negotiate with them in a bona fide effort to arrive
at a collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of holding
928 [VOL. 11:6
IMPASSE UNDER NLRA AND ECA
Individuals raised the idea that labor legislation needed to provide
protection in those cases in which the employer was "strong enough to
impress his will without the aid of the law."'" The drafters of the
NLRA created no mechanism for intervention to respond to this concern.
Should impasse occur, they are not allowed to resolve it by anything
that would, as the drafters of the NLRA noted:
compel anyone to make a compact of any kind if no terms are arrived at
that are satisfactory to him. The very essence of collective bargaining is
that either party shall be free to withdraw if its conditions are not met.
But the right of workers to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing must be matched by the correlative duty of employers
to recognize and deal in good faith with these representatives.'
2. Unilateral Implementation of New Terms of Employment
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and other American
courts hold that the statutory prohibition against bargaining in bad faith
and the definition of bargaining in good faith, in the NLRA," bar em-
ployers from making unilateral changes in working conditions.' Thus,
an employer who takes unilateral action with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, violates the NLRA's
legal obligation to recognize and to bargain with its employees' repre-
sentative.' Even parties acting in good faith, however, cannot always
reach an agreement. When there is an extended impasse and no means
of resolving it, the parties can not make changes that one or both de-
sires.('
governmentally supervised elections to determine the choice of representatives of
employees becomes of little worth if after the election its results are for all
practical purposes ignored. Experience has proved that neither obedience to law
nor respect for law is encouraged by holding forth a right unaccompanied by
fulfillment. Such a course provokes constant strife, not peace.
National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 74TH CONG., IsT SEss. (1935). reprinted in NLRB LEG. HISTORY II,
supra note 55, at 2321.
64. Id. at 2335.
65. Id. at 2335-36; see infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text (demonstrating
a great resemblance to the ECA on this point).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d) (1994).
67. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
68. But see Old Line Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 N.L.R.B. 499. 502 (1951). en-
forced, Associated Unions of America v. NLRB. 200 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1952).
69. Id.
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A bargaining impasse places two important values in conflict: the
mutual co-determination of the workplace expressly provided for in the
NLRA and the concern that work will halt, imperiling the enterprise's
profitability. The courts give the latter ascendancy because, as the deci-
sions reveal, there is a presumption that the natural state of affairs is for
the employer to determine workplace terms. 70 Co-determination, partic-
ularly when it entails opposition to the employer's plans, is an example
of one of the ways in which the NLRA is inconsistent with those values
of the American legal system which support the central role of the free
market and the unrestricted flow of goods and services.7 Not surpris-
ingly, the courts resolve this conflict by permitting an employer to im-
plement its final offer, once a bona fide impasse occurs.72 This concern
and its solution, ceding to the employer the power to create impasse, to
decide when impasse exists, and to resolve impasse by imposing the
employer's will as to any terms the employer wishes, is an overreaction.
This solution not only ignores the role the employer plays in creating
the problem, it actually rewards the employer for conduct at odds with
the NLRA's purpose. The courts' response to this problem has broken
with the spirit of the NLRA.
Allowing the employer to implement its final offer, once a bona fide
impasse exists, permits the employer to supplant jointly determined con-
tract terms with terms known to be unacceptable to the union. Arguably,
when an employer wants new workplace conditions, by definition, the
employer no longer finds the existing ones attractive. Nonetheless, there
is a significant difference between maintaining once agreed-upon terms
and implementing new terms one side rejected. Even if some of the
existing terms become wholly unacceptable, this cannot justify allowing
the employer to implement its entire proposal. By the same token, al-
lowing an employer to implement its final offer piecemeal creates a
distortion. The employer can renege on issues it conceded during negoti-
ations and keep those conceded to by the union. This would allow the
employer to achieve terms more favorable to it than those in its last
offer.
70. Cf. WEILER, supra note 47, at 228 (revealing a presumption in favor of em-
ployer unilateral control).
71. See generally Fahlbeck, supra note 6, at 307, 314 (stating that the "U.S. was
unparalleled in . . . its fight against restrictive business practices and its encourage-
ment of industrial competition'); see also Jeffrey Follett, supra note 48, at 2-3 (giving
collected arguments and citations).
72. See ATLESON, supra note 62, at 14; Dannin, Collective, supra note 6, at 55.
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The judicially created impasse and implementation doctrine provides
an elaborate method for subverting the bargaining process. As originally
conceived, this doctrine permitted implementation only after ensuring
that it enforced the obligation to bargain?3 Before an employer can
implement its final offer, the parties must reach a bona fide impasse. A
bona fide impasse exists only if the employer fulfills its statutory duty
to bargain in good faith.74 This finding depends on "whether its con-
duct at the bargaining table (and elsewhere) demonstrates a real desire
to reach agreement and enter into a collective-bargaining contract. s A
bona fide impasse entails finding that the employer had a "serious intent
to adjust differences or a desire to reach acceptable common ground. 76
Finding this intent entails examining the totality of the employer's
conduct, that is, inferences drawn from its behavior as a whole?7
Courts can take into account actions outside negotiations, particularly
"conduct which is inconsistent with an intent to bargain with the Union
in good faith at the bargaining table."78 Conduct which evinces bad
faith includes regressive offers and reneging on prior agreements?' An
employer can take a firm position;' however, a take-it-or-leave-it atti-
tude, "Boulwarism," is a classic example of bad faith bargaining 8 '
Once the parties are at a bona fide impasse, an employer may imple-
ment some or all of its contract proposals.' Impasse is defined as "the
point at which further bargaining would be futile."'  Even if such a
73. See generally Colorado-Ute Electric Assoc., 295 NLRB 607 (1989), re,'d,
939 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 955 (1992) (reversing an
earlier decision allowing an employer to implement a wage plan unilaterally because
it fulfilled the duty to bargain in good faith before a valid impasse).
74. See Larsdale, Inc., 310 NLRB 1317, 1318 (1993).
75. Industrial Electric Reels. 310 NLRB 1069, 1071 (1993).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1072; see Dayton Electroplate, Inc., 308 NLRB 1056. 1062 (1992).
78. Dayton Electroplate, Inc., 308 NLRB at 1063.
79. Id.
80. See Industrial Electric Reels, 310 NLRB at 1071-72; Larsdale, Inc.. 310
NLRB at 1319-20.
81. See General Electric Co. 150 NLRB 192 (1964), enfd, 418 F.2d 736 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
82. Goldsmith Motors Corp., 310 NLRB 1279, 1285 (1993); Colorado-Ute Elec-
tric Assoc., 295 NLRB 607 (1989), rev'd 939 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1991). cert. de.
nied, 504 U.S. 955 (1992).
83. Larsdale, Inc., 310 NLRB at 1318.
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point is reached, new concessions or an expressed willingness to com-
promise makes it difficult for the courts to find an impasse.84
The trend in decisions since the mid-1980's has been to find that the
parties have reached a bona fide impasse, despite little time spent bar-
gaining and weak evidence that more effort might not result in agree-
ment."5 The NLRB willingly excuses conduct which it once found to
be evidence of bad faith. 6 In a recent case the Board stated that "the
duty to bargain does not preclude a party from making its best offer
first, or require 'auction' bargaining."' The inevitable results are like
an awkward dance. Unions make successive concessions, attempting to
narrow differences, to stave off having terms imposed. Employers, on
the other hand, stand firm or try to widen the gulf because, doing so
successfully gives them the ability to set workplace ' terms without com-
promising.
Allowing employer implementation creates the doctrinal problem that,
if bona fide impasse is too easily found, then the doctrine permits a
legalized form of Boulwarism. This anomalous result is made possible
because the statute provides no means to break impasse, other than a
requirement to notify mediation services that a contract is nearing expi-
ration.8 By the courts' logic, implementation is superior to requiring
the parties to remain on the old terms until they reach agreement.89
The NLRA forbids turning to dispute resolution methods which have
been used in countries, such as Canada," and pre-ECA New Zea-
land,91 and in public sector negotiations in the United States,2 such
84. Id. at 1319.
85. Dannin, Collective, supra note 6, at 52-54, 63-64.
86. Id.
87. Industrial Electric Reels, 310 NLRB 1069, 1072 (1993).
88. NLRA § 8(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (1994).
89. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
90. See generally Gary Chaison & Joseph Rose, The Canadian Perspective on
Workers' Rights to Form a Union and Bargain Collectively, in RESTORING TIH
PROMISE OF AMERiCAN LABOR LAW 241, 242 (Sheldon Friedman, et al. eds., 1994)
(stating that the American system is concerned with establishing the framework of the
relationships, and not with the process of bargaining). In contrast, the Canadian
system focuses on disputes, negotiation and providing machinery to administer agree-
ments. Id.
91. GEARE, supra note 3, at 32-37, 201-03.
92. See Charles Craver, Public Sector Impasse Resolution Procedures, 60 U.
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 779 (1984); see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 43, §§ 1101.801-110-
1.807; WIs.STAT.ANN. § 111.70(4).
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as voluntary and compulsory conciliation, mediation, and interest arbitra-
tion.9
The courts, as judicial bodies, can not usurp the legislative function
of creating institutions to resolve impasses. On the other hand, nothing
compelled them to develop the doctrine of implementation upon im-
passe. By putting a process in place so at odds with the Act's purposes,
the courts have upset the legislative balance and provided employers
with a threat they can always hold in reserve. The doctrine of unilateral
implementation of an employer's final offer is such a potent weapon in
the employer's arsenal that it frequently defines the manner in which
collective bargaining takes place, even when no impasse or implementa-
tion ever occurs.
B. THE EMPLOYMiENT CONTRACTS ACT
1. The Statutory Scheme of the ECA
The ECA is so novel that a discussion of impasse issues must begin
with a sketch of ECA bargaining. Most fundamentally, the ECA does
not support or promote collectivity and thus, lacks any mechanism to
foster collective, as opposed to individual, negotiations. The ECA neither
requires bargaining with the other party nor makes bad faith bargaining
a violation.94 Collective action cannot arise from the legislation's pre-
scription for collective, as opposed to individualistic, arrangements for
bargaining working conditions, since there are none. The ECA's hands-
off or nonprescriptive attitude toward collectivity stems from its underly-
ing philosophies: that it is undesirable and unnecessary to level the play-
ing field in negotiations between employers and their employees and
that, to do so, creates rather than solves problems. 95
The ECA, and particularly as the Employment Court interprets it,
treats its two forms of employment contracts, the individual employment
contract (IEC) 6 and the collective employment contract (CEC), 7 in
93. See NLRA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994)(stating that "[niothing in (the
Act] shall be construed to authorize the (NLRB] to appoint individuals for the pur-
poses of conciliation or mediation').
94. See generally Dannin, Overcome, supra note 1, at 122.
95. Cf id. at 43 (stating that at the time of the ECA's introduction "[New Zea-
land] society had come to view the rights of consumers and investors to maximum
freedom of action as the paramount interest").
96. ECA § 19. An IEC is "an employment contract that is binding on only one
employer and one employee." ECA § 2. Their existence as part of bargaining legisla-
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non-intuitive ways. Negotiations, on an individual or collective basis, do
not predict and have no bearing on, whether the result is an IEC or
CEC. The only significant distinction between an IEC and a CEC is the
number of signatory employees. The only meaningful distinction be-
tween "individual" and "collective" under the ECA is the number of
names at the end.
A CEC is not collective as a result of the process used to achieve it.
Employees can sign CECs one-by-one and, hence, without the power
and processes of collective negotiation. New Zealand workplaces are
filled with identical IECs, without one having terms tailored to the indi-
vidual. An IEC can even arise from collective negotiations, either en-
gaged in with the purpose of achieving an IEC or by default at the
expiration of a CEC, when its terms are incorporated into an individual
contract by force of law under § 19(4).98
tion is a result of the ECA proponent's libertarian agenda, which included the indi-
vidualized employment contracts as a means of imposing on employees behavioral
norms based on individualistic common law principles. This view holds that "courts
could be relied on to rule against collective interventions by reference to freedom in
the labor market." Guy Standing, Labor Regulation in an Era of Fragmented Flexibil-
ity, in EMPLOYMENT SEcURrrY, supra note 7, at 426-27.
97. ECA § 20. A CEC is "an employment contract that is binding on one or
more employers and two or more employees." ECA § 2.
98. When the parties are unable to agree on a successor document, the product
of collective negotiations (in the case of an award) or at least a CEC lives on. ECA
§ 19(4). All terms of the CEC are incorporated into the IEC unless they "could have
no application to the individual employment contract and [did] not affect or concern
the employee, either directly or indirectly." Prendergast v. Associated Stevedores Ltd.,
[1992] 1 ERNZ 737, 752 (1991). Section 19(4), in essence, incorporates by reference
the collective terms into the individual contract. United Food Workers v. Talley,
[1992] 1 ERNZ 756 (1991). Even customs, that is, implied terms, can become part of
the individual contract under § 19(4). See New Zealand Merchant Serv. Guild Indus.
Union of Workers, Inc. v. New Zealand Rail, Ltd., [19911 2 ERNZ 587, 599 (1991)
(incorporating an implied term into an employment contract); cf. James v. James,
[1991] 3 ERNZ 547, 552 (1991) (allowing rates under the CEC to apply to the indi-
vidual employment contracts). During the ECA's first three years as many as 34% of
New Zealand employees worked under IECs whose terms arose from expired awards
by operation of § 19(4). JOHN DEEKs, LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN
New ZEALAND 518 (2d ed. 1994). The figure may be either larger or smaller to an
unknown degree, since no good data collections or surveys exist to explain how con-
ditions were set for nearly half New Zealand's employees. Id. at 518-19. Prior to the
ECA, collective agreements applied to occupations across work places. They were
called awards for historical reasons that did not necessarily reflect recent reality. For
many years collective agreements did emerge as awards made in interest arbitration.
More recently arbitration was a rare occurrence. Id.
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The ECA gives employers power to control workplace conditions by,
first, permitting employers to enter into a CEC "with any or all of the
employees employed by the employer 99 and, second, by making those
terms determinative."° When a CEC exists, "each employee and the
employer may negotiate terms and conditions on an individual basis that
are not inconsistent with any terms and conditions of the applicable col-
lective employment contract."' 0' Thus, an employer can enter into an
agreement with two employees, the minimum for a CEC, and then use
it to set all other employees' terms since an IEC must not conflict with
the CEC. In other words, the ECA provides a creative and bold em-
ployer with extraordinary power and means to reach agreement on the
employer's terms.
2. Impasse Resolution Under the ECA
Within its first four years, ECA case law has gone through wide
swings: from developing a doctrine which permitted employer unilateral
implementation to its current retreat from that position. The Employment
Court's earliest decisions suggested that unions and employees should
not follow their natural tendency to assert power through collectivity
but, rather, were better off seeking IECs. In Lyn Grant v. Superstrike
Bowling Centres Ltd., ° the court held that employers could not
change a worker's pay and working conditions provided by an IEC
unless the worker consented to the changes."°3 The Minister of Labour,
Bill Birch, applauded the Superstrike decision, because it enforced "the
government's intention that employment contracts [could] not be
changed unilaterally."'"° This case also allayed union concerns that
99. ECA § 20(1).
100. Id.
101. ECA § 19(2).
102. [19921 1 ERNZ 727 (1991).
103. Id. at 734.
104. Rebecca Macfie, Cook Strait Ferry Row Charts Way for Future, NAT'L Bus.
REv., Sept. 13, 1991, at 15. The National Government had been at some pains to
quell widespread opposition. It tried to assure people that the ECA would not be
used as harshly as was feared. For a description of these events, see ELLEN DANNtN,
WORKING FRFYn NEw ZEALAND'S EmPLoYNm-r CoNTRACrS Act (forthcoming
through Auckland University Press in 1997). One month prior to the ECA's enact-
ment-even before it was reported back to Parliament from the Select Committee and
its final form could be known-Birch issued a "householder's pamphlet" which stated
that changes in collective contract terms could come about only if both employer and
employees agreed to them. INDUS. RELS. SmV.. DE'T OF LABouR CrE TARi Mare),
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employers who had believed they would be allowed unilateral power to
change pay and conditions under the ECA would not find it so easy to
impose their wills."5 The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions
(NZCTU) announced that workers could take courage and not sign infe-
rior contracts.1 6
The NZCTU was, however, prematurely optimistic, although with
good cause. Superstrike was a reasonable interpretation of the ECA's
application in the then-common situation in which a CEC or award
expired with no successor agreement. Perceptive unionists quickly altered
their way of dealing with employers as a result of Superstrike. 7 In
May 1992, Graeme Clarke, secretary for the activist Manufacturing and
Construction Workers Union, advocated IECs in difficult bargaining
situations, both to protect workers' conditions, and to force collective
negotiations. At this time Grame Clark noted that:
[T]he legislation is such that an employer cannot unilaterally change an
individual contract. And the one thing that we did in the panel beating
[collision] industry and anywhere for that matter, where we couldn't re-
TH EMPLOYMENT CONTRACrS AC: A BRIEF GUIDE (TE TuRE KAWENATA MAIn1) 3
(1991). Comments by government officials on these early cases betrayed a sense of
relief, suggesting they had shared the ECA critics' concerns. PARL. DEB. (HANSARD),
43D PARL., 2D Sass., 898 (March 19-20, 1991) (ques. no. 2).
105. See Diane Keenan, Landmark Contracts Act Ruling Pleases CTU, THE PRESS,
July 16, 1991, at 1. Murray French of the Wellington Employers Association placed
the blame for this misconception on unions.
The problem that we encountered was that the opponents of the Act very much
created an environment where it was suggested that employers would be doing
all sorts of horrible things to employees, simply taking conditions off them,
unilaterally reducing wage rates, the whole lot if you can imagine what that is
they claimed the Act would do. Now, unfortunately, that created some miscon-
ceptions out there in terms of what employers could actually do and the more
hard nosed employers in fact believed that propaganda and in fact they were as
much a problem to us as they were to the employees that they employed, quite
simply because they believed what they were reading in the newspapers and
therefore acted accordingly. And we had employers doing silly things.
Interview with Murray French, Wellington Regional Employers Association, in Wel-
lington (May 14, 1992).
106. See Keenan, supra note 105, at 1. These reactions were "a sad reminder of
just how far away from anything approaching a balance in bargaining the new legisla-
tion has led us" and that the decision "simply asserted a fundamental principle of
contract law." John Hughes, Changing Contracts, INDUST. L. BULL. 74 (Nov. 1991).
107. Interview with Graeme Clarke, General Secretary, Manufacturing & Construc-
tion Workers Union, in Wellington (May 5, 1992).
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new the award for an increase, which an increase in wages would have
helped organize people and consolidate them, we refused to renew it.
And so on the 15th of May [1991], everyone was suddenly on an individ-
ual contract, and we went around and we told people: 'they cannot
change your individual contract. If you don't sign anything, they can't
change it.' And the sheer fact in a recession where things are being cut,
they cannot change an individual's contract and must force them to
change through a collective contract, means that an employer who wants
to change has got to negotiate the collective contract; that's the only way
he can get a change.'0
During this early period, the Employment Court solidly supported the
imperviousness of IECs. In Northern Local Government Officers Union,
Inc. v. Auckland City,'09 Judge Goddard observed.
It is therefore important not to whittle away the rights of parties during
the period between the expiration of a collective employment contract and
the negotiation either of a new collective employment contract or of new
individual employment contracts. During that intermediate period nothing
should change except that provisions which are extraneous to the individ-
ual employment relationship will lapse."0
However consonant this might be with normal contract law, these deci-
sions did not resolve employer desires for changed conditions. The early
decisions of the Employment Court frustrated employers because they
felt that contemporaneous high unemployment would have given them
the upper hand in bargaining."' Ironically, it was this very disparity
between employers, who were strong at this time, and workers, who
were economically and legally weak, which prompted the workers to
108. 1&
109. [1992] 1 ERNZ 1109 (1991).
110. 1d. at 1123.
111. In May 1991, when the ECA came into effect, official unemployment was on
the rise, topping 10.1% or 163,800 unemployed. Rebecca Macfie, Unemployment Rate
Tops 10%, NAT'L Bus. REv., July 9. 1991, at 1. By June 1991, the figure had
soared to 253,000. Herbert Roth, Chronicle, 16 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL_ 317. 317 (1991).
48,000 jobs were lost between November 1990 and 1991. most, 36,700. were lost
between May 1991 and November 1991. Jason Barber, Contracts Act 'A Disaster,'
THE DOINION, May 2, 1992, at 3. Real unemployment undoubtedly was much high-
er. As of December 13, 1990, it was estimated that true unemployment figures were
between 15-20% through 1990. Roth, supra, at 95, 98.
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cling to their IECs."2 At this point, the very nature of the ECA as the
embodiment of the neo-classical vision was in danger.
Employers had several options open to them. First, they could pull up
short and abandon the potential of the ECA by letting workplace terms
stay in status quo indefinitely. Second, they could press forward ruth-
lessly with the ECA vision by terminating recalcitrant employees and
replacing them with new ones willing to agree to the employer's
terms."' Finally, they could take a middle ground and press the courts
to permit them to apply their desired terms to existing employees. While
each of these options had potentially negative consequences for employ-
ers, different employers found one or another more desirable depending
on the skill level of their current workers, the strength of the employer's
desire for new terms, and the employer's ability to engage in litigation
to create new precedent." 4 No employer, particularly one who just
achieved the power available under the ECA, was likely to seek legis-
lative change to balance employer-employee strength.
Enough employers chose to compromise the ECA's vision and press
for the third option (apparently having decided they wanted to retain
their current employees but on different terms) that case after case be-
fore the Employment Court attacked the principle that changing employ-
ment terms required employee agreement." 5 Again and again, unions
battled the question whether employers could unilaterally alter individual
112. See generally Macfie, supra note 111, at I (discussing the bargaining cli-
mate).
113. This option would appear to be available based on debates on the ECA. Lab-
our party MP Michael Cullen unsuccessfully attempted to amend the ECA so that any
employee-party to an IEC would have seven days to repudiate its terms without that
repudiation being a resignation; pay and other conditions of work in an IEC could
not be decreased or altered without the consent of the employee and that it be an
offense for an employer "to terminate, or threaten to terminate, the employment of
any employee who does not agree to amend the pay, conditions of employment, penal
rates or provisions relating to paid holidays." See PARL. DEB. (HANSARD), 43D PARL.,
2D SESS. 1581 (Apr. 30, 1991).
Michael Cullen re-proposed these amendments when the personal grievance
section of the ECA was debated and they were again defeated. He proposed that it
would be grounds for a personal grievance if an employer terminated or attempted to
terminate an employee in retaliation for an employee's refusing to agree to a change
in pay or working conditions. This was also defeated. Id. at 1594-95. For a full
discussion of this, see Ellen Dannin, Transnational Migration of At-Will Employment:
Radical Law Reform and Its Social Context, B.U. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
114. See Dannin, Bargaining, supra note 1, at 472.
115. See New Zealand Resident Doctors Ass'n v. Otago Area Health Bd., [1991]
1 ERNZ 1206; Northern Local Gov't. Officers Union, Inc., [1991] 1 ERNZ at 1109.
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contracts and won.' 16 There were, however, strong signals even in
these early decisions that the Superstrike doctrine was not stable. Even
in cases in which the Employment Court held for the employee, the
Court revealed its difficulty reconciling employees' right to refuse to
change their employment conditions with employers' claims of economic
necessity. Even in Superstrike, the judge said that he sympathized with
the employer's desire to eliminate penal rates." 7
The Employment Court was faced with a dilemma and no clear way
to resolve it. Employers wanted concessions; however, employees could
remain indefinitely on their terms and thus had no incentive to accede
to concessions. The statute provided no impasse resolution mechanisms
other than a strike or lockout. Strikes were not an option for employees
under these poor economic conditions. For employers, lockouts were not
appealing for several reasons. First, employers assumed, rightly or wron-
gly, that ECA would lead to easy agreements." 8 Such assumptions
rendered the reality of irresolvable conflict and the need to consider
locking out incomprehensible. Furthermore, lockouts would have led to
unwelcome costs in a troubled economic situation.
Logically, this stalemate made no sense, since the ECA's purpose was
not to insulate employees from market forces. However, in reality, the
normal weapons for ending impasse were too blunt or too frightening
for the opponents to wield. The Employment Court was troubled by the
ECA's promoting freedom of choice, both for employees and employers,
and how to reconcile their rights with other parts of the legislation.
These conflicting legal and practical issues pressured the judges to find
a way through the morass created by the legislature.
116. See, e.g., New Zealand Resident Doctors, [1991] 1 ERNZ 1206; Northern
Local Gov't. Officers Union, Inc., [1991] 1 ERNZ at 1109; Beazley v. City of
Auckland, [1992] 2 ERNZ 716, 721-22 (1991).
117. Superstrike, (1991] 1 ERNZ at 736.
118. During the time the ECA was being drafted, the major employer umbrella or-
ganization, the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) stepped up its propaganda
in support of the new conflict-free regime which was about to come into existence.
For example, in November 1990, just before the draft ECA was introduced by the
National Party, the NZEF issued The Benefits of Bargaining Reform, "a publication
designed to change employer attitudes so that they will take full advantage of the
menu of opportunities National is offering them." New Zealand Employers Federation,
The Benefits of Bargaining Reform 3 (1990). The publication enumerates NZEF goals
for industrial relations in a short essay entitled "The Vision - An Ideal Organization"
and contrasts this with "The Reality - A Picture of Many Enterprises." Id. Ideally,
there would be a sensitive and rapid defusing of controversy to obtain mutually satis-
factory results. Id.
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Perhaps equally as strong pressures on the Employment Courts came
from the severe criticism of powerful forces (particularly the New Zea-
land Employers Federation (NZEF) and the New Zealand Business
Roundtable (NZBR)) who just succeeded in their long campaign to enact
the ECA. 9 In a 1992 study of the Labour and Employment Courts,
the NZEF and NZBR warned that, if the courts engaged in judicial ac-
tivism, which they defined as protecting workers rights, the result would
be lower wages and unemployment. 2 This argument reflected crit-
icisms made during debate on the ECA by the NZBR,"' the
NZEF,' 2' and employers' as they argued against retaining a special-
119. See Rebecca Macfie, Opinion, NAT'L Bus. REv., Sept. 20, 1991, at 8.
120. NEw ZEALAND BusINEss ROUNDTABLE & NEw ZEALAND EMPLOYERS FEDER-
ATION, A STUDY OF THE LABOUR-EMPLOYMENT COURT 1 (1992). This paper made a
strident attack on the Court's integrity and demanded that it be eliminated. Id. at 1.
The study noted:
In the open, competitive economic environment that New Zealand firms now
face, employers will not be able to absorb additional employment costs arising
from Court decisions. As the pattern of judicial rulings is factored into firms'
decision making, any cost-increasing restrictions in the name of workers protec-
tion will be offset by lower wages and/or other employment conditions that are
less favorable. The overall change in the balance of contractual terms could
disadvantage many employees. Those most adversely affected would tend to be
marginal and low paid workers who will either not be employed at all, or will
be employed at rates of pay that are lowered further by the artificial increase
in costs arising from Court-imposed standards.
Id. This was a continuation of arguments made before the enactment of the ECA. See
Dannin, Labor, supra note 30, at 28.
121. It argued that retaining a specialist labor court would perpetuate a specialist
body of law and viewpoint not rooted in general contract law, to the detriment of the
economy. Submission to The Labour Select Committee on the Employment Contracts
Bill 22 (New Zealand Bus. Roundtable ed., 1991) (unpublished paper) (on file with
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
122. The NZEF favored a specialist labor court but with jurisdiction limited to
hearing appeals on questions of law. NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYERS FEDERATION, EM-
PLOYMENT CONTRACTS BILL 1991: SUBMISSION B26 (1991).
123. Many charged that the predecessor Labour Court had overturned discharges
because the employer failed to follow its own disciplinary procedures and thus had
created a trap for the unwary. Interview with Murray French, supra note 105. Other
evidence suggested that the Labour Court had never reversed otherwise valid discharg-
es solely on procedural grounds. Richard Whatman, Submission to the Labor Select
Committee on the Employment Contracts Bill 4-5 (n.d.) (unpublished paper) (on file
with AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
Some employers charged that the court was unsympathetic to employer needs.
For example, John Foster of Richmond, Ltd. faulted the Labour Court for not allow-
ing an employer to cut costs by laying an employee off, except when the economic
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ist labor court to resolve labor disputes, or at least strictly restricting its
jurisdiction. The ECA embodied the latter argument, establishing the
Employment Court'2 4
That such pressures affected the Employment Court can be no more
than speculation. Nonetheless, within one year, the Court gradually dis-
tinguished those cases which permitted employees to remain on IECs so
that eventually the right became meaningless. During its first months,
the Employment Court continued to refuse employers the right to uni-
laterally modify employment terms, either explicitly or by erosion
through nonobservance."z The Court was firm in its rejection: "[V]e
feel bound to say that we regard as dangerous the suggestion that a
party to an employment contract may breach it at will so long as that
party is motivated by reasons of a commercial nature which it finds
compelling.'
'
The Employment Court rejected employer arguments based on com-
mercially compelling reasons for not being bound by provisions of the
employment contract or that it could exercise managerial preroga-
tive."z Judge Goddard relied on analogy to normal contract law and
stated:
Such an approach, if accepted, would enable almost any contractual obli-
gation to be evaded .... By and large, however, the time for the exer-
cise of the management prerogative is when entering into employment
contracts and not at the time of their performance. If an obligation has
been assumed then it must be discharged and a party to an employment
contract which fails to discharge an obligation is always at risk of being
ordered to comply with the contract. It is quite fallacious to regard some
obligations under an employment contract (for example, to pay wages) as
being important and others... as being in some way subsidiary and
requiring to be complied with only if the party on whom the obligation
rests sees fit. The cardinal rule is that employment contracts create en-
survival of the company was at stake, thus ignoring the "reality that if cost-cutting
measures are not taken by down-sizing an operation then full scale closures and re-
dundancies may follow." JOHN FoSTER, REALSio THE POTENTIAL OF THE MEAT
INDUSTRY 105, 108-09 (New Zealand Bus. Roundtable. ed., 1990).
124. ECA § 104.
125. See Prendergast v. Associated Stevedores Ltd., [1991] 1 ERNZ 737, 753;
Rebecca Macfie, Labour Court Stops Move to Dilute Work Contracts. NAT'L Bus.
REv., July 31, 1991, at 12.
126. Northern Local Gov't. Officers Union Inc. v. Auckland City, [1992] 1 ERNZ
1109, 1125 (1991).
127. Id.
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forceable rights and obligations and it is not for the Court or the Tribunal
to decide which obligations should be enforced and which need not be;
the parties have already decided that for themselves by entering into the
contract, and it is not open to the Tribunal to exempt any party from the
obligations assumed.'
Although § 43 of the ECA compelled this outcome, which protected
the sanctity of contract, ' some ECA supporters attacked it. One em-
ployer argued that protecting the sanctity of contract, when the parties
reach an impasse, was wrong because "the ruling, if unchallenged,
would allow workers' terms and conditions to survive indefinitely in
conflict with the employer's desire to rearrange its business more effec-
tively. '13' The NZEF blasted the court's decision as "retrograde" and
continuing "the old rigidities" of prior law.1
3 1
This anger illuminates the problem of resolving the impasse under the
ECA and the skewed view some ECA proponents had of the new law.
When placed in the history of advocacy for the ECA, it reveals unpleas-
ant realities about the process of law reform which led to its enactment.
The drafters of the ECA only included § 43 because the same groups,
which now attacked it, had demanded sanctity of labor contract terms
for at least a decade. 132 The NZBR, for example, argued that without
such a provision the prior law was defective and that this omission was
128. Id. at 1127-28; see Northern Distribution Union (Inc.) v. 3 Guys Ltd, [1992]
3 ERNZ 903, 921-22 (1992). In a later case, the Court continued to reject arguments
based on Respondent's "wider responsibilities." As the Court noted:
If by that he meant wider than its contractual obligations and so wide as to
relieve the respondent from performing those obligations, I must firmly reject
that submission out of hand as being without foundation in law or reason. As I
indicated in the course of argument, the fact that the respondent could make a
large saving by altering the contractual environment did not authorize it to do
so any more than a similar consideration would authorize it to stop paying its
taxes or its rates.
New Zealand Merchant Service Guild Indus. Union of Workers, Inc. v. New Zealand
Rail, Ltd., [1991] 2 ERNZ 587, 601 (1991).
129. Part IV of the ECA provides: "The object of this Part of this Act is to es-
tablish that--(a) Employment contracts create enforceable rights and obligations . .."
ECA § 43(a). The ECA also provided for midterm modifications of CECs in writing.
ECA § 23.
130. Keenan, supra note 105, at 1.
131. Retrograde Decision Under Appeal, THE EMPLOYER, Sept. 1991, at 1; see
Knowles, supra note 30, at 19.
132. See NZBR, New Zealand Labour Market Reform: A Submission in Response
to the Green Paper 38 (Apr. 1986) (unpublished paper) (on file with AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y).
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"a major reason why unions are encouraged to behave irresponsibly,
why the relationship between unions and employers often becomes sour
and confrontational, and why the opportunities for productivity-enhancing
cooperative behavior are severely restricted." ' It continued:
One of the employers' most common complaints concerns (the absence
of) sanctity of agreement. Agreements have come to be broken with im-
punity, sometimes because the cost of insisting on adherence is greater
than the immediately discernible benefits of preventing the erosion of
legally acceptable behavior. What gradually develops is the industrial
habits of the swamp. Agreements should have the standing of contracts. If
one party breaches the contract the other party should have access to
remedies within the law. It should also be the basic responsibility of the
parties to a contract to ensure it is enforced.}'
The NZEF concurred, arguing that labor agreements "should be contrac-
tual. This would grant them greater sanctity because the parties would
be bound by agreements which they themselves had fashioned and are
thus bound to enforce.'
31
Despite this, within four months of the enactment of the ECA and §
43, these groups found sanctity of contract not to their liking. To their
credit, even before the ECA's enactment they realized that the conjunc-
tion of impasse and sanctity of contract presented precisely this problem
and had already ceased pressing for it. During the debate on the ECA,
the NZEF advocated letting employers establish terms of employment
unilaterally. 36
An employer's ability to decree workplace terms, however, conflicted
with sanctity of contract and it also undermined the basic premise which
employer groups advocated. that contract terms be set by market forces
through party negotiations. 37 For example, the NZBR responded angri-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Employers Federation Submissions on Industrial Relations Green Paper, THE
EMPLOYER, June 1985, at 3.
136. See Macfie, supra note 119, at 18; NZEF, Submission on the Employment
Contracts Bill 1991 Part A, at 3 (Jan. 30, 1991) (unpublished paper) (on file with
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y). Some employers wanted both sanctity of contract and
the ability to set at least some terms unilaterally. Select Committee Chair Max Brad-
ford stated that "[t]he common thread running through employers' submissions was to
introduce more certainty and stability into the collective-bargaining process. In addi-
tion, employers wanted final control over the form and number of collective employ-
ment contracts in a particular work-place." PARL DEB. (HANSARD), 42D PARL, 2D
SESS. 1425 (Apr. 23, 1991).
137. See NZBR, New Zealand Labour Market Reform: A Submission in Response
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ly to the draft Labour Relations Act of 1987.3 (the legislation which
preceded the ECA) because it failed to provide for market contract-
ing 39 Had the idea been accepted that sanctity of contract was a nul-
lity and employers were allowed to impose their own terms, the legisla-
tion would have violated free market ideology, as well as claims that
employers and employees could peaceably resolve workplace terms with-
out intervention.
For years employer groups argued that employers and employees'
interests were unitary and that negotiation and discussion permitted them
to reach common ground."' In the post-ECA reality that faced them,
however, employers found that it was difficult to convince employees
that the employer's terms were in the best interest of both business and
employees; the only alternative appeared to be to impose terms unilater-
ally. 4' Employers' inability to secure agreement through discussion
and explanation seriously weakened an important tenet of the ECA: that
employers and employees' interests were unitary. 42
Impasse illuminated other fundamental conflicts between key parts of
ECA ideology. On the one hand, imposition naturally follows from the
ECA as one of its stated purposes since it allows economic change to
flow efficiently, or at least quickly, through the economy. Imposing
terms, however, conflicts with its goal of freedom of contract. The ECA
presupposes that it is freedom of contract, a willing buyer and seller
to the Green Paper 40 (Apr. 1986) (unpublished paper) (on file with AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y); The Labour Relations Bill, THE EMPLOYER, Apr. 1987, at 5.
138. NZBR, Submission to the Labour Select Committee: The Labour Relations
Bill (Mar. 1987) (unpublished paper) (on file with AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
139. Id. Even more ironically, on the eve of the ECA's enactment, some employ-
ers argued that they be able to make changes if they could prove economic necessity.
See Rebecca Macfie, Lawyers Split Over Breach of Contract, NAT'L Bus. REV., May
21, 1991, at 12. Obviously, this was an argument that was tantamount to reestablish-
ing the prior system of interest arbitration.
Had the Court accepted either this or the argument that sanctity of contract not
be respected, it then truly would have been continuing "the old rigidities" of the prior
law in the sense of reestablishing aspects of the law against which the NZEF and
NZBR had fought vigorously. Id.
140. See ALAN Fox, INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: RESEA-
RCH PAPER No. 3, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS As-
SOCIATIONS: THE DONOVAN COMMISSION (1966).
141. See generally Dannin, Solidarity, supra note I (discussing the ECA's applica-
tion in its early years).
142. This problem is a fallout from the gap between their use of economics as an
exercise in logic as opposed to an economics based in the complexities of how peo-
ple actually interact. Id.
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coming to terms, that achieves the optimum condition, not through dic-
tating change. 43 Rather than serving as an instrument of change, the
theory of freedom of contract, as envisioned, now stood as a dam to
change.
The existence of impasses, which employer and employee could not
resolve amicably, casts serious doubt on the way ECA proponents ar-
gued bargaining would work." To the extent there was a labor mar-
ket, its functions were far more complex than envisioned. Employees
seemed unwilling to realize that their interests were one with their em-
ployers. Employers seemed unable to provide information to permit a
win-win solution to be reached. Where employers had employees who
they deemed overpaid for their skills but unwilling to agree to the rate
of pay their employers offered them, the employers, theoretically, should
terminate the relationship and retain new workers willing to accept the
offered rate.145 Ideally employers should bid against each other for
workers' 46 None of this happened.
Employers proved reluctant to terminate the relationship when unable
to reach agreement and to pursue negotiations with a new willing seller
of labor, as ECA advocates theorized would happen.10 This reluctance
cannot be fully explained by law. The problem was not legal, since the
law supported such grounds for termination."a Instead, economic and
143. See PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK 108 (1990); Richard Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REv. 947, 951 (1984).
144. In November 1990, just before the ECA was introduced, the NZEF issued
The Benefits of Bargaining Reform. NEIV ZEALAND EMPLOYERS FEDERATION, THE
BENEFITS OF BARGAINING REFoR, 3 (1990). Benefits gives a fair example of how
the NZEF assumed ECA bargaining would operate. "[E]ach employee is committed to
a set of operational and personal objectives, through participation in the planning pro-
cess." Id. The workers are individually fulfilled, problem solving team workers who
work through "[s]taff associations [which] where they exist are strong and loyal" and
facilitate the sensitive and rapid defusing of controversy to obtain mutually satisfactory
results. Id. Management provides information freely and regularly and shares profit
with the workers, "after capital retention and dividend decisions have been made." Id.
Bargaining freedom would be "the first step in which workers and employers decide
their own destiny." Id. at 4.
145. See WELER, supra note 45, at 125-126.
146. Id.
147. But see Culhane v. Ports of Auckland Ltd., (1991] 3 ERNZ 497.
148. Discharge was likely made more difficult by the existence of redundancy pro-
visions in existing agreements. Others may have feared that discharge would contra-
vene ECA provisions on lockouts or invite personal grievances. However, nothing in
the ECA suggested that such a discharge was illegal. Terminating or threatening to
terminate an employee's job to force agreement would seem to be harsh and oppres-
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social factors made the process of setting terms far more complex than
the rudimentary version of economics described by ECA proponents.1
49
It is no simple matter to terminate a work force. Training even low-
skilled workers is expensive. Employee tenure, with its retention of
worker knowledge and skills which can be disseminated to new workers,
are an advantage to an employer. Workers who fear replacement by
others are reluctant trainers. Some employers may fear acquiring an
unsavory reputation which would spread easily in a small country like
New Zealand and make it difficult to hire all but the least desirable
workers. Whether for these or other reasons, workplace utopia, as long
and powerfully advocated by groups such as the NZEF and NZBR, was
at an impasse.
Even worse than being proved intellectually wrong, 5' arguing now
sive behavior, undue influence, or duress of the sort forbidden by § 57. ECA § 57.
Section 57, however, expressly requires that a contract have come into existence as a
consequence of the conduct for the infringement to be brought before the court and
does not apply where none was consummated. Id. Furthermore, § 57's chief reme-
dy-setting aside the contract or ordering "any party to the employment contract to
pay to any other party" appropriate compensation-would be an inadequate remedy
for termination. ECA § 57(4)(b).
Other remedial provisions are equally inapplicable. Section 28 is not directed to
conduct in bargaining but, rather, only to issues of membership and representation.
ECA § 28. Section 28 prohibits dismissing employees or imposing detriment on them
in retaliation for their "involvement in the activities of an employees organization."
ECA § 28(1)(b). The ECA makes a clear separation between union membership and
bargaining. Thus, though § 28 comes close, it also does not prohibit termination for
lack of agreement.
149. See Christoph Buechtmann, Introduction: Employment Security and Labor
Markets, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, supra note 7, at 3, 47 (Christoph F. Buechtmann
ed., 1993) (observing that, given turnover costs, the labor market does not function
like an auction market so that what appear to be rigidities (e.g., sluggish work force
adjustment or wage stickiness) are actually the outcome of efficient transactions be-
tween workers and frmns). Indeed, maximum flexibility in employment adjustment may
not be desirable. See Robert Boyer, The Economics of Job Protection and Emerging
New Capital-Labor Relations, in EMPLOYMENT SEcuRrrY, supra note 7, at 70, 71.
150. The NZEF and NZBR argued that labor flexibility would have an unambigu-
ously positive impact on employment. However, these problems demonstrated that the
neoclassical theory they relied on was flawed.
The theory relies on crude and irrelevant hypotheses about the employment
relationship, which have been rejected by recent theories of capital-labor rela-
tions. Labor market flexibility is optimal for employment and welfare only if
labor can be assimilated to its services and if labor is hired in a spot market
where no adverse selection problems occur or commitment and loyalty issues
are at stake. By contrast, when we recognize the separation of contracting labor
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against sanctity of contract and freedom of contract left them open to
claims that their justifications for the ECA were no more than a means
of disguising their real goals: to give employers unilateral control of the
workplace. For those who cared about history and consistency, the
stream of studies, polls, experts, and position papers produced by the
NZBR and NZEF over at least a decade and all their claims to be act-
ing unselfishly, purely for the good of the country, were reduced to
mere propaganda pieces without substance or meaning.
Few saw these conflicts and problems. Despite the problems just
described, when employers argued for the right to unilateral control
based on economic exigency, this created an intellectual and practical
conflict which profoundly troubled the Employment Court.' Slowly, a
new trend became visible in its decisions, a trend toward giving employ-
ers absolute control over how they would get on with their businesses.
The first steps were subtle. In Culhane v. Ports of Auckland Ltd., 52
the employer argued that it should be able to replace its twenty-seven
port workers, who were on IECs, with lower-paid workers because it
had commercially compelling reasons and because it should be allowed
to exercise managerial prerogative.s The court was unwilling to per-
mit the employer "merely to replace the 27 workers in this case with
other workers doing practically the same work."'" However, when the
employer filed affidavits stating that it had accepted bids to subcontract
the work, the court seized upon this argument and ruled that the em-
ployer could do this pursuant to its inherent managerial prerogative.ss
After Culhane, those who had thought they could avoid concessions
by remaining on IECs would soon learn they had no way to prevent
from its actual utilization, the long-term character of most modem employment
relationships, and the key importance of work effort and loyalty to the firm,
then the basic neoclassical model collapses. New and more sophisticated models
provide evidence of numerous contradictory effects that the impact of employ-
ment security can no longer be assessed on a priori grounds.
Boyer, supra note 149, at 117.
151. See Grant v. Superstrike Bowling Centres, Ltd., [1992] 1 ERNZ 727 (1991).
152. See Culhane v. Ports of Auckland, Ltd., [1991] 3 ERNZ 497.
153. Id. at 498.
154. Id. at 501. As discussed, it might have permitted the employer to do this,
since the ECA's philosophy, legislative history, and structure suggest an employer can
terminate employees who are unwilling to agree and replace them with those ready to
accept the employer's offer. Id.
155. Id. at 502. As discussed above, terminating employees who refused to accept
an offer and replacing them with ones willing to would seem to be contemplated by
the ECA. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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employer implementation. The Employment Court announced a series of
decisions which soon permitted an employer unilaterally to modify even
IECs. The key to avoiding Superstrike and its progeny and to legitimate
an employer's unilateral modification of IECs was to expand § 64(1)(b),
which covered only lockouts involving CECs, 56 apply it to employees
on IECs, and couple it with a unique interpretation of partial lock-
out.
157
The case of Prendergast v. Associated Stevedores Ltd., 5 1 provided
the link between the concepts. When negotiations broke down, the em-
ployer wrote all employees that negotiations for a CEC were at an im-
passe and that it would no longer observe the terms of their IECs on
the deadlocked issues:
'The Company's non-observance and non-performance of these terms will
continue until you and each of you agree to comply with the demands of
the Company to enter into a Collective Employment Contract which in-
corporates the following terms:
"(i) The NZ Waterfront Worker's Union is not a party to a Collective
Contract to which you and other permanent employees are a party togeth-
er with the Company.
"(ii) There is no restriction on the Company's ability to engage
whatever number of non-permanent employees it requires.
"(iii) There is no requirement on the Company under the Employment
Contract to engage other Company's permanent employees to drive the
ship's cranes, derricks or other mechanical equipment.'1
5 9
The employer stated that the company's "breach" of the IECs' terms
would continue until employees agreed to the terms and that it expected
its workers to perform their work as usual, except for these changes.'16
The union charged that this was an unlawful lockout and that the com-
pany was in breach.' 6' This placed the issue of interpreting §§ 62 and
64 squarely before the Employment Court and in the light least favor-
able to the employer, particularly since the employer's actions were in
156. The ECA defines a lawful lockout as relating to the "negotiation of a col-
lective employment contract for the employees concerned." ECA § 64(l)(b).
157. ECA § 62 defines as a lockout either an employer's discontinuing employees'
employment wholly or partially, § 62(l)(b), or breaking some or all of the employ-
ment contracts to compel compliance. § 62(1)(c).
158. [1991] 2 ERNZ 728 (1991) [hereinafter Pendergrast II]; see Rebecca Macfie,
Watersiders Fail in Bid for Lockout Injunction, NAT'L Bus. REv., Sept. 6, 1991, at 3.
159. Prendergast 1I, [1991] 2 ERNZ at 732.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 732-33.
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defiance of a prior decision by the Employment Court, and thus argu-
ably contemptuous.
Instead of finding a violation or contempt, the Court, in Prendergast
II, held that the company's breach of contract was actually a lockout
under § 62.162 The Court reasoned that the employer satisfied the ele-
ments of a lockout because it was the discontinuance of employment,
either wholly or partially; the breaking of some or all of the employ-
ment contracts; or the refusal to engage employees for work it usually
employed employees to perform with the employer's purpose being to
compel the employees to accept its proposed terms or demands.'6 The
judge held that the outstanding issues demonstrated that the lockout
related to the negotiation of a CEC, and thus did not violate the
law,1" which provided that a lockout was lawful only if it related "to
the negotiation of a collective employment contract for the employees
concerned."' 65
The judge in Prendergast II dismissed arguments that the partial
lockout was merely a subterfuge to evade the court's earlier decisions
which forbade the unilateral alteration of IECs, because, he found, the
employer had directed the partial lockout towards securing a CEC.'
The judge admitted, however, that it was difficult to reconcile decisions
denying an employer the right to alter IECs unilaterally with the deci-
sion that an employer could achieve the same result by partially locking
the same employees out of their terms of employment 67
The case which came to stand for the partial lockout doctrine was
Paul v. New Zealand Society for the Intellectually Handicapped
(IHC),1ss issued January 15, 1992. IHC notified its employees that it
162. Id. at 734. See ECA § 62.
163. Prendergast II, [1991] 2 ERNZ at 734.
164. Id. at 741.
165. ECA § 64(1)(b).
166. Prendergast II, [19911 2 ERNZ at 741.
167. As the judge stated-
The defendant now seeks to selectively breach individual employ-
ment contracts, thereby creating a lockout in order to compel each
and every permanent employee to agree to the removal of these
provisions from their individual employment contracts. There are
difficulties in establishing exactly what constitutes the status quo
and I accept [plaintiff counsell Mr. Quigg's submission that here
the defendant is attempting to do something it previously could not
do.
Ild.
168. [19921 1 ERNZ 65 (1992); see generally Jason Barber, Employment Court
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was unilaterally cutting their wages by a third as a lockout to compel
them to accept this as a contract reduction in their wages.'(, The IHC
reduced plaintiff Evelyn Paul's pay from $NZ30,555 [$18,027] to
$NZ20,650 [$12,184].170 As in Prendergast, IHC told its employees
that it would require them to continue "to perform all the work speci-
fied in your Contract of Employment .... the action by IHC as your
employer in breaching some of your terms of employment is taken with
the view to having you accept employment on the foregoing terms." ''
Breaching contracts by imposing new terms violated the ECA,'
but since the employer's intent was to compel its workers to accept its
terms, the cuts were a lawful partial lockout. 73 Plaintiffs argued that
the breach of contract and the employer's demands were identical, that
the cuts were a breach and could not be a lockout, and that the court's
distinction based on employer intent was meaningless. 4 The employer
countered that it was not simply changing or breaching the workers'
IECs, but was trying to force workers to accept those terms as part of a
new CEC. 75 This was, thus, a lockout where the employer was "dis-
continuing the employment of any employees .... wholly or
partially."' 176 The court agreed with the employer that, since the chang-
es occurred in conjunction with negotiations for a CEC, the employer
took the actions to compel an agreement.'"
Ruling Angers Unions, THE DOMINION, Jan. 15, 1992, at 1 (discussing the decision).
169. [1992] 1 ERNZ at 76-77; see Jason Barber, IHC Parties Plan Talks Under
Threat of Action, THE DOMINION, Dec. 5, 1991, at 9; Roth, supra note 111, at 123.
170. Paul, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 81-82.
171. Id. at 77.
172. See NZ Dairy Food and Textile Workers' Union v. Cavalier Bremworth, Ltd.,
[1991] 2 ERNZ 519 (1991).
173. See Roth, supra note 111, at 125.
174. Paul, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 83.
175. Id.
176. ECA § 62(1)(c); see [1992] 1 ERNZ at 83; Rebecca Macfie, Employers
Exercise Muscle Under Contracts Act, NAT'L Bus. REv., Mar. 6, 1992, at 39.
177. Paul, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 84-85. Judge Castle stated: "Tihe only relevant
issue is whether negotiations are in fact being conducted, not quality or bargaining
strength of them or the parties. The allegation that IHC has been unreasonable or
inflexible, if found to be so, is therefore of no avail to the CSU." Id. at 85. Judge
Castle further noted that sections 9 and 18 of the ECA gave the court no role to
play in deciding whether negotiations were or were not fair. Id. Section 9 provides
that the object of bargaining under the ECA was to allow the parties to negotiate
terms of employment in a variety of forms. ECA § 9. Section 18 provided that nego-
tiations should include negotiations as to whether contracts would be individual or
collective and the number and mix of contracts at an employer. ECA § 18(l)(a)(b).
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In Hyndman v. Air New Zealand Ltd.,'78 the Employment Court
admitted that its motive for permitting partial lockouts was to allow
changed conditions when one party would not agree to them.'P Judge
Colgan said that it made no sense to call strikes or lockouts unilateral
variations of the terms of employment contracts, because:
[sluch a proposition does not permit of any legitimate attempt to vary a
contract of employment and could, if taken to its logical conclusion, mean
that either an employer or its employees could indefinitely frustrate the
other from ever being able to move from the existing terms and condi-
tions of an inherited employment relationship .... [The lockout or
strike] is more realistically recognized by the legislation as being a strate-
gy in the negotiation of another CEC as occurred here.2E
Trade unionists criticized these cases and the court's holdings as
evidence that the ECA's purpose was to give employers unilateral con-
trol over employment conditions.' Anne Knowles of the NZEF
claimed that the doctrine was a simple and limited endorsement of the
rights of strike and lockout under the ECA.m The patent illogic of
the partial lockout doctrine made defending it difficult. All consequences
turned on the employer's definition of its intent. Changing working
conditions is illegal when the employer simply desires to impose chang-
es but legal when the employer says it wants to have the workers sur-
render to its will by agreeing to those changes. In the former case,
workers have the right to enforce the original contract terms. In the
latter, they have no such right. An employer has no incentive to end a
lockout, since the ECA places no onus on an employer who refuses to
bargain. As a consequence, once imposed, changed conditions through a
partial lockout could last a very long time indeed, further reducing the
discernible difference from a unilateral change.
Labor relations reporter Rebecca Macfie savaged the Court's treatment
of the issue.
Any employer looking for concessions in wage bargaining from his
workforce should be swotting up on the Employment Court's decision on
the recent IHC dispute with the Community Services Union. It's a step
by step guide to how to enforce immediate pay cuts on an unwilling
178. [1992] 1 ERNZ at 820 (1992).
179. Id. at 835.
180. Id.
181. See Barber, supra note 168, at 1.
182. See Macfie, supra note 104, at 39.
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work force without falling foul of the law. All he needs to do is follow
the protocols established in the IHC case:
*First, ensure the collective employment contract with his workers has
expired.
*Tell his workers that the wants a new collective contract(s), listing
the changed conditions he wants included in that new contract.
*When the workers resist the proposals in negotiations, notify them the
changes will be imposed on them regardless, being careful to specify that
this measure takes the form of a lockout under section 62 of the Act, and
that the lockout section is taken with the intention of compelling them to
accept the propsed new terms of employment.
*Let them know they are expected to front up for normal work regard-
less of the lockout. (Remember, a lockout doesn't necessarily involve
literally locking the factory gates. As the IHC case shows, non-observance
of selected provisions of workers' contracts can constitute a lockout.)
Voila! Immediate cost savings have been achieved without having to
laboriously extract an agreement from an intransigent union.
True, having taken this course of action the employer does not yet
have a new contract with his workers, but the terms and conditions he
was seeking are in place, and there is no compulsion to end the state of
lockout...
It is no exaggeration to say that, by permitting this tactic, the Court
replaced the possibility of parties' reaching mutually agreeable terms
with a regime of non-bargaining. Indeed, a study of bargaining outcomes
and behavior during this period confirmed Macfie's observations. The
study found that in nonunion work places, the situation of the majority
of workers at the time, no bargaining was taking place, regardless of the
form of contract."8 4
Certainly, Macfie was not far wrong in her description of how easily
an employer could avoid bargaining and unilaterally vary terms of em-
ployment. The Employment Court handed down case after case which
rapidly expanded the doctrine. In Petricevich v. Transportation Auckland
Corporation Ltd.,' the union (the Northern Local Government Offi-
cers Union) sought a CEC for 154 salaried employees. The employer,
however, wanted them on IECs. When the employer unilaterally changed
the terms in the employees' IECs, the Court held that this was not an
183. Macfie, supra note 176.
184. See Ian McAndrew & Matt Ballard, Negotiation and Dictation in Employment
Contract Formation in New Zealand, 20 N.Z. J. INDuS. REL. 119 (1995).
185. [1992] 3 ERNZ 807 (1992).
952 [VOL. 11:6
IMPASSE UNDER NLRA AND ECA
illegal unilateral modification of IECs, but rather, a legal partial lockout
because one of the parties (the union) had sought CECs.'" In other
words, even though the partial lockout was to force employees to agree
to IECs, the Employment Court found it actually related to the negotia-
tion of a CEC, since the employees wanted a collective agreement. The
court reasoned that since the union could have struck in support of its
demand, the employer had the reciprocal right to lockout."
This case cut deeply into the Superstrike protections for employees
with IECs. The court denied, however, that its decision permitted the
employer to unilaterally impose a new contract, an act which would
violate Superstrike.'88 As the Court in Petricevich noted:
There can on the facts placed before me be no issue about that. The
employer on the facts is clearly proposing to reduce its compliance with
its obligations under the subsisting contracts. It proposes not to pay as it
had before. It proposes no other interference with the terms of the present
contracts. It does not propose to bring in any terms of any new con-
tract. 
1 9
In other words, a new contract did not exist; the workers were indefi-
nitely working under terms identical to the desired new contract.
The minimal differences between the ways a CEC versus an IEC
could be consummated arguably made it reasonable to permit lockouts
to apply to both forms of contracts whenever some element of collective
negotiations existed. However, justifying the partial lockout doctrine on
these grounds would be an entirely different matter if employers could
186. Id. at 810-11.
187. Id. at 813. See Adams v. Alliance Textiles (NZ), Ltd., (1992] 1 ERNZ 982,
986-87 (1991), appeal dismissed as moor, [1993] 2 ERNZ 783 (CL App. 1993). There
is another side to this issue of reciprocity. Although it seemed fair to treat both sides
of the relationship equally or reciprocally, to do so there must be parties who are
similarly situated. The Employment Court believed this to be the case and if it per-
mitted conduct to one side, the other was to be given the same liberality. See Emer-
gicare (Henderson) Ltd. v. New Zealand Nurses Union, [19911 2 ERNZ 583, 586
(1991). This, however, ignored significant contextual distinctions. If workers stage a
slowdown, a species of partial strike, they can give themselves a raise only in the
sense that they work less for each dollar received. Short of outright theft, workers
camot unilaterally raise their pay. A partial strike is even less effective for achieving
goals not based on money for unit of time or effort, for no partial strike can impose
an improved insurance benefit. The employer, conversely, can establish the very con-
ditions it desires.
188. Petricevich, [19921 3 ERNZ at 812.
189. Id.
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lock out employees when negotiations were taking place on an undeni-
ably individual basis, that is, with only one employee. Were an employ-
er to be given the power to impose a partial lockout against a single
individual, the doctrine would be exposed as nothing more than sophist-
ry designed to let employers have the terms they wanted. It was not
long before the court did precisely that.
In O'Malley v. Vision Aluminium Ltd. (I)"9 and O'Malley v. Vision
Aluminium Ltd. (HI),' 9' the employer offered a concessionary EEC to an
employee. When he refused to agree to the reduced terms, the employer
notified him he would be locked out."9 The employer next assembled
all the separate IECs into a document it called a "CEC which incorpo-
rated all IECs in its workplace".' 93 The Court accepted this compila-
tion of IECs as a CEC, even though there was no collective bargaining
or collective contract.'9 The Court found collectivity since the "indi-
vidual workers were made aware by management-and no doubt through
discussion with each other-that their IECs essentially reflected the same
terms and conditions which were to apply through the work force."' 195
If this was not sufficiently egregious, the employer made threats to lock
out before the employee had seen the contract at issue. 96
The employer's power to impose its terms unilaterally developed in
cases other than those involving a partial lockout and through the ex-
pansion of other legal doctrines. For example, in United Food Workers
v. Tally,197 the Employment Court grossly expanded the contractual re-
quirement of consideration as a requirement for a contract. It held that,
although consideration was necessary to vary an employment contract,
the changed terms themselves might constitute such consideration, even
190. [1992] 2 ERNZ 368 (1992) [hereinafter O'Malley (I)].
191. [1992] 2 ERNZ 660 (1992) [hereinafter O'Malley (11)].
192. O'Malley (1), [1992] 2 ERNZ at 369.
193. Id. at 370.
194. Id.
195. O'Malley (II), [1992] 2 ERNZ at 677.
196. Id. at 678-79. In the end, a technicality, the failure to include an expiration
date in the contract, as required by § 22, was fatal to the employer's efforts to lock
out the single employee who had not signed. Thus, had the contract contained an
expiration date, the employer could legally have locked out its employee only hours
after he was first shown the document and despite there having been no collective
negotiations. Id. at 682, 685, 686-88.
197. Id.
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though these terms "superficially appear to be one-sided." The Court
stated, a court should find consideration where it could.'"
The Court also expanded the employer's power by giving it the abili-
ty to force the other side into negotiations on the employer's terms. In
the months after September 18, 1991, when the award granted to De-
signpower employees in expired,"9 about half the staff signed new
JECs offered by the employer. When the first partial lockout cases
appeared, the employer reversed itself and said it wanted a CEC, but the
union, the Public Service Association (PSA), and those employees who
had not signed new IECs now wanted to retain their IECs based on the
terms of the expired award.' To make it absolutely clear that there
was no element of collectivity, the employees informed the company
that they had withdrawn the PSA's authority to negotiate collective-
ly.' The company responded that it would lock them out unless they
agreed to begin negotiations for a CEC. 03
Unlike the NLRA, the ECA does not limit bargainable issues, but,
instead, permits employees and employers to negotiate even fundamental
matters, such as "whether employment contracts are to be individual or
collective" and "[t]he number and mix of employment contracts to be
entered into by any employer."2" This means that even basic issues,
akin to the NLRA's unit determination t can be the subject of nego-
198. Id. at 439.
199. Designpower was an Electricorp subsidiary. Electricorp was a former govern-
ment agency. After NZBR member Rod Deane became the Commissioner of the State
Services, the process of converting government agencies to state-owned enterprises
proceeded. Electricorp was one of the new state-owned enterprises in which the
NZBR was most heavily involved. See Michael Williams, The Political Economy of
Privatization, in THE FouRTH LABOUR GovNMENr. PoLmcs AND Poucy IN NEw
ZEALAND 140, 141-144 (Martin Holland & Jonathon Boston eds., 2d ed. 1990); Nic-
ola Natusch, An Analysis of the Influence of the New Zealand Business Roundtable
Since Its Inception 68 (unpublished paper 1990) (on file with AM. U. 1. INT'L L. &
POL'Y). During the period 1987 through 1989, NZBR members Athol Hutton, Roger
Kerr, and Rod Deane had board positions at Electricity Corporation and its SOE
form, Electricorp. Id at 68-69. At Electricorp, even before the ECA, management was
able to break the award down into seven separate documents which emphasized the
worker-employer relationship. Id.
200. Designpower, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 672-75.
201. Id.
202. Id. See Jason Barber, Lockout Comes as Court Hears Union's Case. DO',N-
ION, April 13, 1992, at 3.
203. Designpower, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 674.
204. ECA § 18(1)(a), (b).
205. See NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994).
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tiation. In Designpower, negotiations concerned a § 18 preliminary mat-
ter, the number and mix of contracts, and not the substantive terms of
the contract.' The employer argued for an expansive reading of § 18
to define these negotiations as relating to a CEC.2" Furthermore, the
employer borrowed from partial lockout doctrine and contended that,
since its objective was coercive, the lockout was lawful." 8 The judge
agreed and held that § 64(1)(b) permitted lockouts intended to coerce
the other party to engage in negotiations for a CEC when it preferred
IECs.2°9
On April 13, 1992, Designpower locked out those employees who
had not signed agreements or given assurances they would negotiate for
a CEC.210 The union argued that the lockout violated § 5(a) by trans-
gressing employees' freedom of association, their rights to "choose
whether or not to associate with other employees for the purpose of
advancing the employees' collective employment interests."' The
judge found that the ECA disaggregates the contract from the process of
negotiations so that the employer's desire for a CEC could not affect
employees' collective rights.
I am satisfied on an assessment of all of the evidence presented that, as
the defendant asserts, it is indifferent to whether its relevant employees
associate with others of them in relation to the company's desire to nego-
tiate a collective employment contract .... I accept that Designpower is
even now indifferent as to how the negotiations for a collective employ-
ment contract are to be conducted in the sense that its coercion of em-
ployees has not been for the purpose of persuading them to associate with
others of them to advance their collective employment interests but has
rather solely been to coerce them into negotiations for a collective em-
ployment contract. 212
206. Designpower, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 689-90.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See Barber, supra note 168, at 3; Roth, supra note 111, at 252. A similar
situation occurred in Hawtin v. Skellerup Indus. Ltd., [1992] 2 ERNZ 500 (1992). In
that case an employee sought individual negotiations. When he refused to sign the
CEC, he was given a lockout notice. Id. at 527.
211. ECA § 63(d) defines a lockout or strike as unlawful if it deals with matters
of freedom of association. ECA § 63(d).
212. Id. The union also argued that an employer's use of its superior position
through a lockout, as an attempt to coerce employees into collective action, was an
"unconscientious abuse of power" and thus constituted undue influence. Id. at 685-86.
However, the court held, given that all strikes or lockouts include the use of coer-
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In other words, the Employment Court sanctioned the disjuncture of the
final document from the process used to gain it.1 This interpretation
effectively read the word "collective" out of § 64(l)(b); it permitted a
strike or lockout whenever there was the form of collectivity even if not
the substance of collectivity in a contract.
One interesting feature of the union's strategy against Designpower
was that it tried to use this disaggregation to its advantage by concerted-
ly engaging in individual actions. It took this peculiar course because it
thought engaging in overt collective resistance rendered the employees
more directly vulnerable to coercion and the application of partial lock-
outs. This decision, however, cut off an avenue for a union to respond
to a court's interpretations of collective act and contracts. The
Designpower decision thus permitted an employer to define every action
it wished to take as collective, however tenuous the connection with
matters collective. The impact of the decision was immediate; the union
acceded to the employer's demands
2 t 4
Designpower was not the end of the Court's expansion of the mean-
ing of a lawful lockout which related to "the negotiation of a collective
employment contract" under § 64(l)(b). The Employment Court in
Hawtin v. Skellerup Industrial, Ltd.,215 construed the level of negotia-
tion required by § 64(l)(b):
The phrase, within its particular context, 'relates to the negotiation of a
collective employment contract,' enables an employer, I hold, to peremp-
torily and without any prior process of negotiation with its affected work
force, to present an otherwise lawful collective employment contract to its
particular employees and to uncompromisingly insist that unless they
cion, there must be something extreme to lead to a conclusion that they constitute
undue influence. Id. at 686.
213. One important implication of this for researchers is that data as to number or
percentage of CECs versus IECs is meaningless in terms of telling us whether collec-
tive or individual negotiations are taking place. In fact, it is impossible to know what
is happening in the process of New Zealand negotiations without seeking workplace
data that asks specifics about the process of bargaining, or, to put it more carefully,
the process by which the CEC or IEC was achieved, since no bargaining at all may
have been involved. As the Employment Court has said, negotiations for an employ-
ment contract "can amount to the presentation by one intended party to the contractu-
al relationship of a form of contract to the other and the former's refusal to deviate
from its offer." Northern Distribution Union (Inc.) v. 3 Guys Ltd., [19921 3 ERNZ
903.
214. Id.
215. [1992] 2 ERNZ 500 (1992).
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accept the collective contracts terms within a prescribed time, they will
then be locked out. Mr Weston [employer's counsel], I conclude, has
correctly submitted that: 'An employer.. . can, theoretically, set its bot-
tom line as from day one. If that bottom line is not acceptable to the
employees then it can lock them out.'
216
The judge said that this was true even though it was "significantly re-
moved from the primary meaning of 'negotiations', contemplating a pro-
cess of 'conferring with another with a view to compromise or agree-
, n17ment,.
Those who are familiar with American labor law will recognize the
court's language as a version of the unfair labor practice known as
"Boulwarism," a term which essentially refers to "take-it-or-leave-it"
bargaining. Boulwarism is a violation of the NLRA's duty to bargain in
good faith. Although the employer wants to sign an agreement, it is es-
sentially going through the motions of collective bargaining and not
attempting to adjust the parties' differences in order to reach common
ground.1
Contemporaneous with the Employment Court's acceptance of the
tenets of Boulwarism, the Court explicitly promoted an idiosyncratic
version of Boulwarism as a legitimate method of bargaining related to
labor-management cooperation. 219 As the proponent of this concept ex-
216. Id. at 536.
217. Id. at 537; accord Northern Distribution Union (Inc.), [1992] 3 ERNZ at 915
(indicating that negotiations for an employment contract can amount to no more than
the presentation of a contract to the other party with a refusal to deviate from the
offer).
218. LEROY S. MERRIFIELD, et al., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
512 (8th ed. 1989). Even though Boulwarism remains an unfair labor practice, in the
1980's the NLRB all but sanctioned conduct which was essentially indistinguishable
from Boulwarism. See Dannin, Collective, supra note 6, at 64-68.
219. Cf Northern Distribution Union (Inc.), [1992] 3 ERNZ at 915-16. The same
confused view has apparently spread to Australia. The reporter here demonstrates that
he has completely reversed what is understood as good faith bargaining in the United
States, although, fortunately, the Australian court had it right:
Another issue the full-bench decision raises is bargaining in good faith, a US
concept alien to Australian industrial relations in the legislative sense before the
Industrial Relations Reform Act of 1993. It promises to generate considerable
legal and industrial debate as parties contest what constitutes good-faith bargain-
ing. The full-bench decision says: 'Negotiating in good faith would generally
involve approaching negotiations with an open mind and a genuine desire to
reach an agreement, as opposed to simply adopting a rigid predetermined posi-
tion and not demonstrating any preparedness to shift.'
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plained it, this take on Boulwarism linked employers' approaching work-
place relations based on "greater consensualism and involvement" mak-
ing use of "[v]arious innovative practices... including a greater use of
performance-based pay within job ranges, a new interest in productivity
gainsharing and a bargaining stance based on a good first offer from the
employer .... Th[e] latter appears to be a New Zealand application of
what the Americans call Boulwarism .... ." This interpretation
failed to recognize Boulwarism as an illegal act in the United States and
as the antithesis of the give and take that is part of collective bargain-
ingY22
The Employment Court's embrace of Boulwarism was fleeting. It
soon began to retreat from allowing employer implementation at im-
But this definition is at odds with what is understood by bargaining in
good faith in the US. There, General Electric devised the concept of the first
offer to employees being 'final and fair.' Called Boulwarism after GE's vice-
president for labor relations, it has been upheld in the US courts. It represents
a different interpretation of good-faith bargaining, suggesting the Commonwealth
Government may have opened a Pandora's box by introducing this concept.
Nicholas Way, Australia: Employers Losing Faith in Bargaining, Bus. REv. WKLY.,
Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
220. Peter Boxall & Peter Haynes, The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act
1991 on Unions and Non-union Bargaining Agents: An Assessment After 12 Months
(speech at Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington) (May 15,
1992); see Peter Boxall, Management Strategy and the Employment Contracts Act
1991, in EMPLOYmENT COrTRAC=s: Nav ZEALAND EXPERIENCFS 148, 160 (Raymond
Harbridge, ed., 1993); Peter Boxall & Peter Haynes, Unions and Non-union Bargain-
ing Agents Under the Employment Contracts Acts 1991: An Assessment After 12
Months, 17 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 223, 227 (Aug. 1992).
221. See, e.g., Merrifield, supra note 218. The interpretation also suggests a lack
of familiarity with how Boulware himself conceived of his eponymous practice; rather
than making "a good first offer," he relied on extensive research and a full and
lengthy exchange of views with the unions before making an offer. The offer includ-
ed a willingness to change on the basis of new information. In fact, in all but one
negotiation, new information from the union induced the company to alter its offer.
HERBERT NORTHRUP, BOULWARiSM: THE LABOR RELATIONS PoLICIES OF THE GENER-
AL ELECTRIC COMPANY-THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGMENT
ACTION 29 (1964).
Boulware did believe that the employer should take the lead in bargaining,
making an offer it believes is appropriate and right
If, after further bargaining with the union, the management still believes that its
position is correct, then the company should stand willing to take a strike rath-
er than to accede to demands which it believes are not in the rbalanced best
interests" of all "contribution-claimants."
Id. at 139.
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passe. By early 1994, the retrenchment was well under way. In
Mineworkers Union of NZ Inc. v. Dunollie Coal Mines Ltd.,m" the
Mineworkers Union sought an injunction to restrain the employer from
locking out two employees who refused to sign what purported to be a
CEC.m Dunollie's facts were neither better nor worse than many cas-
es in which the Court permitted partial lockouts: the employees' expired
awards had been converted to IECs by operation of law and the
Mineworkers Union attempted to negotiate a CEC. 4 As in many oth-
er cases, the employer changed its goal from IECs to a CEC. Precedent
thus supported the lockout as legal because it related to negotiations for
a CEC.
The Employment Court, however, held the lockout unlawful because
there had been no negotiations and thus the lockout could not be in
relation to the negotiation of a CEC.' The Employment Court tacitly
overruled Designpower by accepting the union's ageement that §
64(1)(b)
cannot mean that an employer, by deliberately bypassing the known
bargaining agent for its workers and submitting a collective contract to
them personally which the employer requires them to sign, can then law-
fully lock those workers out if they refuse to sign the contract upon the
basis that what has materially occurred relates to the negotiation of a
collective employment contract for the employees concerned.n 6
The judge found that, by isolating the workers, the employer could force
them individually to sign the collective contract. 7
In June 1994, the full Employment Court, in Witehira v. Presbyterian
Support Services (Northern),22 explicitly repudiated the partial lockout
222. [1994] 1 ERNZ 78 (1994).
223. Id. at 80.
224. Id. at 83.
225. Id.
226. Mineworkers Union of NZ Inc., [1994] 1 ERNZ at 83.
227. Id. at 91.
228. [1994] 1 ERNZ 578 (1994). The employer imposed a partial lockout by pay-
ing employees the new CEC hourly rate but no penal rate until they agreed to sign
the offered CEC. The court found the impact to be "both immediate and severe." Id.
at 582-83. It stated:
[I]t can cause no surprise that a lockout can be as far-reaching [as a strike] if
not more so as employees are less likely than employers to have reserves to
fall back on. While the impact may seem less severe where the action consists
of a reduction in pay and falls short of a total cessation of pay as happens in
the course of an ordinary lockout, the evidence showed that many employees
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doctrine and three years' work crafting its intellectual underpinnings 2 9
The Court rejected, as tortured logic, that an employer's coercive motive
can justify its unilateral variation of terms, stating, "We do not think
that such a distinction can reliably be drawn in practice. Often a unilat-
eral variation will take the form of an imposition of the employer's
demand. We find the defendant's argument to be circular, unhelpful, and
spurious. '
The Court also fully repudiated its iteration of the partial lockout as a
mirror image of a strike. The Court asserted that a lockout in New
Zealand was always understood to mean that an employer lost produc-
tion but could withhold wages. The court reasoned: 'Ve find it un-
thinkable that parliament ever intended that employers could withhold
wages without suffering any halt in production." m
The Court also found no support in the ECA itself for its interpreta-
tion of a partial lockout, stating that:
It cannot have been intended that the employers should be able to require
their employees to work while paying them nothing. There is, in princi-
ple, no difference between paying nothing and paying a fraction of the
correct amount. Therefore the employees in this case would be seen as
having been required to perform their work for no pay. This is because if
the employer could require them to work for less than their contractual
entitlement, it must have logically been able to require them to work
without being paid at all or for a purely nominal amount. Once seen in
that light the partial lockout, so called, is exposed in its true character.
Just as employees are, or can be, required to lose remuneration when on
strike, so the employer must lose productivity when conducting a
lockout? 3
relied on the full amount of their earnings for their living and household ex-
penses.
Id.
229. Witehira, [19941 1 ERNZ at 582-83.
230. Id. at 585. In reaching its conclusions, the court turned to a number of dic-
tionaries-both legal and those for the general public. It found that none of them in-
cluded the concept of a partial lockout. Id. at 585-86.
231. Id. at 592.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 594. The Employment Court returned full circle to its holding in
Superstrike by basing its decision on the Householders Pamphlet's assertion that em-
ployers could only change wages and other terms of employment with the employee's
agreement. Id. at 596.
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If this was not sufficient rejection, the Court even argued that partial
lockouts violated natural justice and common law values so deeply held
that even Parliament could not destroy them. 34 In the end, the Court
concluded that to allow the employer to require employees to perform
work under the conditions of a partial lockout was to force the employ-
ees to become serfs instead of free people, making the more accurate
term a "lock in."235
In reaching this point, the Employment Court has apparently returned
to its starting point at Superstrike and to a plain meaning reading of the
relevant sections of the ECA.
DISCUSSION
Comparing impasse under United States and New Zealand law pro-
vides useful insights into the interaction of labor legislation, judicial
interpretation and social contexts. At the risk of stating the obvious,
both systems demonstrate how impossible it is to understand a system if
all that is examined is its legislative framework. The problem is that
labor scholars often proceed as if merely examining statutes sums up all
that is to be known about a country's labor system. New Zealand Coun-
cil of Trade Unions Secretary Angela Foulkes echoed this limited per-
spective when she observed that the Employment Court used the ECA's
stated purpose, "to promote an efficient labour market," as its bench-
mark.236 As Ms. Foulkes notes: "It has taken a long time for industrial
relations practitioners to appreciate just how crucial this purpose has
been in determining rights and obligations on matters such as access to
work sites, supply of information, union recognition, and bargaining pro-
cedures." 23
7
Legislators, no doubt, would support what Foulkes says. Certainly
when they enact legislation they wish to see it applied according to the
policies and purpose they intended it to achieve. One would like to
think that a statute's purpose should shape its interpretation. We think
that law performs a pedagogical function; it shapes and develops "habits
that undergird the legal order."23' 8 Thus, Foulkes continues, had the
234. Witehira, [19941 1 ERNZ at 597.
235. Id. at 601.
236. Angela Foulkes, The Culture of Tripartism: Can European Models be Adapted
for New Zealand Use?, 18 N.Z. J. IND. REL. 185, 187 (1993).
237. Id.
238. Kohler, supra note 18, at 226.
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purpose of the ECA been "to encourage the formation of unions and to
facilitate the settlement of industrial disputes... as in the 1894 IC&A
Act, there should have been radically different judgements delivered
from identical sets of facts .... 239
This article's exploration of how the ECA and NLRA have handled
impasse suggests that Foulkes is wrong when she claims that had legis-
lators enacted the ECA with a different purpose courts would have
reached different outcomes. Both the ECA and NLRA are clear in their
purposes, and their purposes are quite different. Despite this, the courts
have interpreted the respective laws to permit the same behavior at
impasse. Furthermore, in the case of the ECA, even though the purpose
of the statute did not change, the court interpreted it in radically differ-
ent ways within a very short period of time.
One explanation for this anomaly is that when the courts interpreted
the statutes, the judges did so without taking into consideration the stat-
ed purposes of either statute. Thus, interpretations of impasse under both
statutes demonstrate that even when the legislation sets out a clear pur-
pose, there is no guarantee that judges will conform their interpretations
to the law's purpose. As a result, legislators' expressly stating their
purpose is no guarantee that courts will reach the outcome the legisla-
tors desire. When judges do not use well-established methods of
statutory interpretation, then they are more likely to fall prey to preju-
dices and social pressures which are not supposed to influence them.
The NLRA provides among its purposes the ends of promoting the
formation of unions and equalizing bargaining power. Certainly, it does
not operate in this way, and one is hard put to find decisions in which
the judiciary has resorted to the NLRA's purposes to guide it in its
interpretation even when those purposes are on point.2  As a result,
the courts have made impasse and implementation so easily available
that only a very unusual employer would resist the temptation to force
impasse by refusing to compose differences so that it could exercise
complete control over the workplace. It is difficult to see how such an
outcome promotes the formation of unions and equalizing bargaining
power.
The ECA provides that its purpose is to "promote an efficient labour
market," yet it is being interpreted without reference to that purpose and
239. Foulkes, supra note 236, at 187.
240. In National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S.
Ct. 450 (1995), the Supreme Court spent some time restating the proper method for
legislative interpretation. Id. at 454-57.
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in ways that ignore it even when it is clearly applicable, as in Culhane
v. Ports of Auckland Ltd.241  In Culhane, the employer claimed the
right to replace those employees unwilling to accept the offered terms
with employees willing to accept these terms. 2 This right would
allow the efficient ordering of the labor market by permitting changes in
accord with market conditions. This would also permit free contracting
for labor. Nothing in the ECA's structure243 or legislative history
244
appears to prevent this. The Employment Court refused to accept this
argument, and it seems few, if any, employers actually attempted to
replace their work forces.245
If legislative purpose means anything, the NLRA and the ECA should
have radically different means of resolving impasse. However, the treat-
ment of impasse under the NLRA and ECA belies this common wis-
dom. Rather than reaching different outcomes, both statutes achieved
virtually identical treatment of bargaining impasses by allowing the
employer to impose its terms. In coming to this outcome, both betrayed
their legislative purposes. The courts betrayed the NLRA's purpose
because Congress designed the NLRA to promote bargaining, and imple-
mentation denigrates bargaining. The Employment Courts betrayed the
ECA's purpose because, rather than a straightforward interpretation that
would allow one party to say to the other - if you won't accept my
offer I will find someone who will - it tried to reach that end with
sophistry, which quickly collapsed.6
241. [19911 3 ERNZ 497 (1991).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 113-119.
245. The problem with a take it or leave it situation in the labor system is that,
while the "take it" part is easy to effect, the "or leave it" aspect is not. Most work-
ers will be unable to leave and thus to exert reverse pressure on the employer to
soften its position, even though both know the employer really cannot survive if
enough employees were to leave. The workers' needs are more pressing and the nega-
tive consequences of leaving more immediate. In other words, if one party is allowed
to say "take it" in workplace bargaining, "or leave it" drops out or has no meaning.
The dominant party knows that the weaker party-unable to resist or leave-will take
it. However, ECA thought assumed the opposite. BROOK, supra note 143, at 108; Ep-
stein, supra note 143, at 966-67.
246. In certain instances, particularly in the case of duress, the Court was willing
to make a more forthright interpretation. Judge Goddard stated:
Many people who enter into contracts are under some pressure to do so arising
from a need, real or perceived, to enter into the particular contract or from an
irresistible desire to do so . . . . Usually where parties enter into contracts with
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The disjuncture between legislative intent and bargaining procedure is
even greater than permitting two ostensibly different statutes to reach
virtually identical processes for dealing with the problem of impasse.
Should the ECA's interpretation continue in the trajectory sketched by
recent decisions, it may protect the bargaining process better than the
NLRA. If the Employment Court finds no substitute for the partial lock-
out, New Zealand will have a legal interpretation less hospitable to
permitting the employer to impose its will than is the case in the United
States. These results seem anomalous and counter-intuitive.
These ironies or failures call into question these anomalous results.
One suggestion indicates that convergence of outcomes is likely to oc-
cur.
in democratic industrialized nations [because] the institutions subject to
legal control, public or private, share basic economic imperatives; if they
are to perform their social functions, legal controls must be compatible
with those imperatives. Hence the 'null hypothesis,' regardless of national
differences in legal methods, demands for security and for economic
competitiveness will produce at least rough convergence in outcomes. If
convergence is lacking, it should be attributable to cross-national differ-
ences in economic resources and constraints 2
This suggests that all laws are rarely an exclusive force 2" Once en-
acted, labor and employment laws evolve to reflect a broad array of
socio-political concerns and law, in terms of statute, is not the sole de-
terminant of labor market outcomes.2 49
their eyes open as to the consequences of doing so and conscious of their right
to refuse there is not only no reason for the courts to intervene but it would
be wrong for them to do so.
Adams v. Alliance Textiles Ltd., [19921 1 ERNZ 982, 1039 (1991). appeal sub nom.
Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd., dis'd as moor, [1993] 2 ERNZ 783 (Ct. App.
1993). Judge Palmer pointed out that the ECA allows employers to negotiate contracts
directly with their employees; thus it contemplated each side would seek its own ad-
vantage. Adams, [1992] 1 ERNZ at 1083-85.
247. Kagan, supra note 9, at 37.
248. MICHAEL V. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT NVORK: PAY EQurry REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILZATION 8 (1994).
249. See Clive HJ. Gilson & Terry Wagar, The U.S.lCanada Convergence Thesis:
Contrary Evidence From Nova Scotia, 50 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELIL1 66, 66-67 (1995);
cf. P.K. Edwards, et al., Introduction: The Workplace and Labor Regulation in Com-
parative Perspective, in WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE GLOBAL CHAL-
LENGE 3 (Jacques Belanger et al. eds., 1994).
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This is not a new insight. In 1935, when Congress first considered
the NLRA, it recognized that the strength of a right depended upon the
power relationships of those affected by the right and upon the insights
and prejudices of those who interpret the right.50 "[S]ome rights in
our economic system [are meaningless] unless those to whom the rights
belong have the economic power to enforce them."' Inescapably,
then, labor law can not be separated from the fabric of its society and
from distinctive attitudes towards workers, unions, employers, and the
proper means of ordering the workplace. 2 "Like family law (from
which it developed), labor law deals with messy things like personal
relationships and seemingly mundane day-to-day issues. '  This fur-
ther suggests that those comparativists who are attracted by discrete fea-
tures of foreign systems exercise extreme caution. Even painstaking care
to import the precise operations of those structures may not yield the
same harvest in foreign soil.
Under the ECA, the impact of these social forces on court interpre-
tations has been intriguing, especially given the rapidity with which the
Employment Court swung from one interpretation to its opposite and
then back again. Speculation suggests several possibilities. The Court
may have been sensitive to the severe criticisms made by powerful
forces on the Right, particularly the New Zealand Employers Federation
and the New Zealand Business Roundtable. It is not possible to know if
these influenced the Court in its decision-making. Certainly, the two
groups attempted to achieve this end."5
In addition, extra-judicial events starting in late 1993 created pressure
to lessen the harshness of the ECA and, perhaps implicitly, its interpre-
tation. On September 21, 1993, the Labour Select Committee issued an
assessment of the ECA which admitted to the need for change in certain
areas5 5 The National Party suffered a serious erosion of power, re-
taining its majority by one vote. In March 1994, the International Labor
Organization found New Zealand to be in violation of Conventions No.
250. For an analysis of these forces on the NLRA, see generally ATLESON, supra
note 62.
251. NLRB LEG. HISTORY, supra note 35, at 315-16.
252. See Fahlbeck, supra note 6.
253. Kohler, supra note 18, at 224-26.
254. A study of the Labour-Employment Court i (New Zealand Bus. Roundtable &
New Zealand Employers Fed'n eds., 1992).
255. See REPORT OF THE LABOUR COMMITTEE ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE EF-
FECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACr 1991 ON THE NEw ZEALAND MARKET
(1993).
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87 on the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
and No. 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectivelyY55 In ad-
dition, community values, a century-long tradition of collective bargain-
ing, and habitual ways of thinking about relationships in the workplace
may gradually have influenced the judges. Law shapes society. At this
time, the laws which preceded the ECA shaped the judges interpreting
the ECA; thus, the legal conventions the judges grew up with funda-
mentally influenced the very terms of their understanding.
The NLRA and ECA help us see how to improve the drafting of
labor statues. One way to ensure divergence from the statutory purpose
is for the legislature not to provide processes to resolve problems likely
to arise in collective bargaining. Both the ECA and NLRA demonstrate
that labor laws must provide explicit means for dealing with the prob-
lem of bargaining impasses. Without distorting its fundamental nature,
the NLRA can easily borrow procedures from similar systems, including
fact finding, conciliation, mediation or interest arbitration. The ECA
does not have other systems to turn to because it is so novel. The im-
passe resolution method which seems to flow from the ECA would be
to permit employers to replace workers or workers to replace an em-
ployer who is unwilling to agree to the terms offered. The problem with
this, as five years' experience demonstrates, is that employers and em-
ployees try to avoid this result as much as possible.
In both the United States and New Zealand, even those actively in-
volved in labor issues often fail to appreciate the interplay and roles of
statutory and common law. This failure has potentially serious conse-
quences. It is not uncommon to hear trade unionists and their supporters
argue that it is statutory law which fetters them and prevents them from
being the powerful organizations they otherwise might be. For example,
Richard Trumka (now vice-president of the AFL-CIO) testified before
Congress, stating:
I say abolish the Act. Abolish the affirmative protections of labor that it
promises but does not deliver as well as the secondary boycott provisions
that hamstring labor at every turn. Deregulate. Labor lawyers will then go
to juries and not to the gulag of section seven rights--the Reagan NLRB.
Unions will no longer foster the false expectations attendant to the use of
the Board processes and will be compelled to make more fundamental
appeals to workers. These appeals will inevitably have social and political
dimensions beyond the workplace. That is the price we pay, as a society,
256. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION. 292ND REPORT OF THE Co.wo1FnEE
ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, Case No. 1698, 9TU 724-740 (Mar. 1994).
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for perverting the dream of the progressives and abandoning the rule of
law in labor relations. I have a profound faith in the judiciary and jury
system as it exists at common law. It has been the enduring bulwark
against biased decision making by 'experts.'" 1
One who had examined the development and impact of the doctrine of
impasse and implementation would have been a little less eager to turn
to the judiciary. It is the courts, the ones in whom Trumka places his
faith, whose interpretations created the doctrine and thus subverted the
NLRA's support for collective bargaining. Advocating a repeal of the
NLRA so that the courts can reinvigorate unions thus is a dangerous
delusion, a failure to face realities of law. 58
Unions and their supporters must face the pivotal and distorting role
played by impasse and implementation in collective bargaining. Until an
employer's ability to implement at impasse is removed, United States
labor will continue to decline. Such a change will not be easy. Not only
must labor fundamentally revise its own thinking in this area, it must
contend with powerful arguments in support of the doctrine. For every-
one who believes that implementation upon impasse cannot be justified
as a functional part of collective bargaining, there are those who accept
it as playing a key role in promoting balance in bargaining5 9
For those in New Zealand, the issue of impasse is currently undevel-
oped and little studied. At this time, many may rejoice that the Employ-
ment Court decides cases in a more humane way and with greater alle-
giance to the traditions of the country. However, as the ILO noted in
the report it issued after visiting New Zealand to consider the impact of
the ECA, the basic structure of the statute is fundamentally unfriendly to
257. Trumpka, supra note 39, at 871.
258. The conclusion, rarely stated, but which must be manifest is "that history
shows the dependence of unions on the legal environment for their success. For ex-
ample, private sector unions did not become a generally powerful source in the econ-
omy until the Wagner Act was passed and evidence suggests that legal rles substan-
tially affect the economic success of unions." John Delaney & Marick Masters, Un-
ions and Political Action, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 313, 340-41 (George Strauss
et al. eds., 1991).
259. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd,
U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996) which descends from a long line of thought that
the natural state of the workplace is for management to manage and that anything
which prevents this is dangerous. See Northrup, supra note 152, at 118. Northrup
views Boulwarism as a benign practice. He saw as positive the provision in section
8(d) which freed management from the requirement to make counter-proposals, as
opposed to just listening to union demands. Id. at 109.
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collective bargaining." Even if the ECA demonstrates that a statute
can survive an interpretation at odds with its basic purposes, it does not
demonstrate that this leads to happy results.
CONCLUSION
When people examine the problem of impasse, as it is interpreted by
the judiciary and applied in practice, it becomes easy to see that trying
to understand a system by looking only at statutory language is at best a
sterile exercise. Legislation, such as the ECA or NLRA, appears func-
tional on paper. However, over time, they developed in such a way that
their operation reveals a collapse in their most fundamental principles. In
the cases of the ECA and NLRA, judicial interpretations of their bar-
gaining provisions offer intriguing insights into the "negotiation of dis-
agreement" and, in each case, drive home the lesson that law cannot be
separated from its full social and judicial contexts.
260. The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association found the ECA's failure to
promote collective bargaining was incompatible with ILO principles. INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFicE, 295TH REPORT OF THE CoMMIrrE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCmTON,
Case No. 1698, IM 254-255 (Nov. 1994).
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